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Ship acquisition is an extremely complex process involving many
highly interrelated individual operations, each critical to the comple-
tion of the final product. A central issue is the design, test, and
evaluation of ship combat systems. This thesis traces the evolution
of modern shipboard combat systems and describes current combat
system test and evaluation concepts. The utility of prototyping combat
systems at land-based test sites is investigated. Ongoing efforts by
the Patrol Frigate Acquisition Project to employ a combat system
land-based test site in the execution of test and evaluation within
present guidelines is described and analyzed. The conclusion is that
the plan for utilizing a combat system by the Patrol Frigate program
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The search for better ways to do things in government is not new.
However, in Naval ship acquisition, a major attempt at better decision-
making is developing.
Both weapons and systems for delivering them have gone through
several revolutions in the years since the end of the Second World War.
Nuclear bombs are now thousands of times more powerful than those
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Breakthroughs in missile tech-
nology are threatening existing systems. Men in space have provided for
military possibilities not thought of two decades ago. Keeping ahead in
the technological race is not in itself a guarantee of security in these
circumstances. It remains essential to incorporate developing tech-
nology into operational hardware and to deploy and use this hardware
with skill and intelligence. No amount of production skill or intelligent
use can compensate for significant shortcomings in the development, test,
and evaluation of the emerging hardware. These important first steps
will be explored in this thesis.
In parallel with the technological revolution in weapon systems in
the past few decades, we have seen the costs of building and maintaining
U. S. Naval ships multiply to astounding heights. The magnitude of these
costs is emphasized by the recognition that overhaul and modernization of
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computerized missile ships now is often more expensive than procure-
ment costs of ships in the past. In the fiscal-year 1975 Navy budget of
$29.6 billion dollars, over $3.6 billion is allocated to the procurement
of six classes of Navy vessels. The process of procuring ships is the
longest, most complex and greatest in dollar volume, of any in the
Defense Department. The cycle from concept to delivery of a new ship
may require five to ten years, with technical improvements evolving
the whole time.
Weapon systems procurement functions are located at the highest
organizational levels in the Services and involve concentrations of the
top technical, procurement, test, and evaluation talent. This has been
driven by an iterative process whereby the accelerating state of the art
has driven the design methodology, management requirements, and sub-
sequently the costs. Program management has been continually revised
in an effort to keep stride with this process and ensure the best ships
possible while keeping effective cost control. Thus the process des-
cribed in this thesis consumes major portions of the resources of the
Navy.
Previous to World War II, the Navy did much of its own design and
development and even some production. But after the war the Navy lost
much of this in-house capability. Consequently, the Navy has of neces-
sity become increasingly reliant upon industry for almost every aspect
of weapon design, development, test, evaluation, and production. The




control of this process in an internal environment, to a more tenuous
and democratic committee control in a largely external contractor
environment -- one that is much more in the public eye. Unfortunately,
the Navy hasn't made this transition smoothly. Within this context, one
area which has not kept pace and is sorely in need of a quantum improve-
ment is the development and management of test and evaluation programs.
These should be structured to assist top management in making procure-
ment decisions and to reduce the uncertainties surrounding these decisions.
Test and evaluation of proposed new weapon systems is one of the
Navy's key controls in the complex process of acquiring today's multi-
billion dollar systems. Testing at decisive stages of development shows
where problems exist and helps Navy managers to make better decisions
affecting future production and purchases of weapons than would other-
wise be possible. The test and evaluation of emerging systems within
itself involves uncertainty however. "How much is enough? " must be
answered for testing itself. It is apparent that many of the problems of
managing a test and evaluation program have important economic aspects.
The fundamental problem of how much to spend on a test and evalua-
tion program is an allocation problem within the ship acquisition program.
Economic theory tells us that we "should" continue to spend on test and
evaluation until the marginal gain from the expenditure's is just equal to
the gain from expenditures elsewhere. But in the case of test and evalua-
tion, this formula is peculiarly difficult to interpret or apply. The gain
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is much more uncertain -- much harder to predict with accuracy -- than
the gain from, say, an additional fighter defense squadron with aircraft
of known performance. This is particularly true of developmental test
and evaluation, where the product, if any, will be mostly knowledge --
and knowledge usually far removed from its practical end use. Rather,
its purpose is one of facilitating the evolution of the ship system itself.
Rapid advances in electronics and computer technology have had a
profound effect on the complexity of shipboard systems and the test and
evaluation needed to support the procurement of these systems. There
is a definite need in the Fleet for ever-increasing speed and accuracy in
shipboard data processing to meet more sophisticated, high-speed threats,
As a result, the key weapon and sensor systems are utilizing digital inter.
faces and processing to as great an extent as possible. The cost and
complexity of the equipment and a movement toward human- engineered
ships does not allow us to keep the luxury of back-up and casualty mode
operation for many of these functions that we had formerly enjoyed. The
demands for greater maintainability and reliability are also forcing in-
creased digitalization. The result is a level of hardware and software
integration never previously encountered in a ship system.
B. THE PATROL FRIGATE PROGRAM
The Patrol Frigate (PF 109) Class, for example, will have digital
fire control systems in the missile, gun and antisubmarine warfare
areas, all linked to command and control within a centrally-located
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computer complex. To complicate matters further, at the time the PF
program was being formulated, DOD policy regarding major weapon-
systems development, acquisition and test was being drastically changed.
In a memorandum issued in the Spring of 1970, Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard indicated that experience with the Total Package
Procurement approach to development and acquisition of major systems
was unsatisfactory; that it should be used with caution; and that a new
policy would soon be established. The new policy took the form of DOD
Instruction 5000. 1 which outlined the "Fly-Before-Buy" approach.
Essentially this new approach requires the services to develop and dem-
onstrate the operability of a weapons system by actual test prior to the
commitment of funds for mass-production of any major system. Progress
in meeting this requirement is reviewed by the Defense Systems Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC) at discrete stages during development.
DSARC determines whether the system is ready to advance to the next
stage. It then makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense con-
cerning funding of the next stage and follow- on procurement.
The very design of the PF evolved in parallel with emerging "Fly-
Before-Buy" policies within DOD. At the CNO/SECNAV level it was
soon realized that it was impractical from a cost and procurement
schedule basis to adhere to the letter of the law of emerging policies.
Tradeoffs were made such that adequate initial test and evaluation for
subsystems is to be demonstrated prior to large-scale ship production.
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Additionally, critical ship system integration is to be demonstrated at
shore-based test sites. In effect then, we have swung from "Total
Package Procurement" to "Fly-Before-Buy" with fewer paper solutions
and more actual hardware testing, hardware proofing and prototyping at
the system, subsystem, and component level.
As early as the concept exploration phase of the PF procurement,
it was realized that weapon selection and subsequent test and evaluation
would be a controlling influence on the eventual size as well as on the
ship cost of the PF. The Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM),
PMS 399, has identified the integration of the combat system as a critical
task in the PF acquisition effort. In conjunction and compliance with
emerging DOD test and evaluation requirements, the PF program has
been structured specifically to provide for an extensive test program
which should substantially reduce technical, cost, and schedule risks.
The information obtained from an evaluation of combat- system test data
will be a major factor in the final decisions on procurement of follow- ships
at CEB, DSARC, and Congressional levels.
Because of its critical nature, the combat system integration effort
will be decoupled from the time-critical events of the shipyard and con-
ducted at a land-based test site. The land-based test site will contain
an installation duplicating, insofar as possible, the shipboard installation
of all sensors, computing equipment, weapons and related subsystems.




utilization of the integrated system which are to be demonstrated at the
land-based test site are envisioned to be computer program debugging
and physical, electrical and mechanical compatibility. Both of these are
traditionally troublesome areas in complex ships.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The major objectives of this thesis were: to investigate and analyze
emerging weapon system procurement, test, and evaluation policies
within DOD and the Navy Department; to document efforts within the PF
development process in view of these policies; and to gain insight into the
use of a combat system land-based test site in implementing these pol-
icies in the procurement cycle.
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II. FROM ROCKS TO COMBAT SYSTEMS
A. BACKGROUND
Man, in his desire for a quicker means of destroying an enemy's
capacity for waging war, has continually increased the complexity and
destructive force of the weapons in his arsenal. From the era of the
rock-throwing caveman, weaponry has now evolved to the era of nuclear-
powered ships and sophisticated guided missiles. Early in the history
of the Navy, the importance of forward-looking weapon system acquisition
was recognized by the organizer of the Navy Gun Factory, John Adolphus
Dahlgren, when he stated, "If the Navy be, indeed, the right arm of
defense, her guns and ordnance . . . are the main sinews and arteries,
the neglect of which soon render it feebled and palsied. "
Rightly called the "father of naval ordnance, " Dahlgren revolutionized
the science of ordnance with his original work and set standards for other
navies. In 1850 he urged construction of frigates armed entirely with
heavy guns, anticipating the dreadnaughts of the next century. A blue-
water sailor as well as a scientist, Admiral Dahlgren brilliantly com-
manded a powerful naval force through two years of arduous wartime
service during the Civil War, leaving behind him an example of produc-
tive study and gallantry in action.
Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren, 1891, by Madelin V. Dahlgren.
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Why the history? The point is that in the early days of weapon
acquisition, test, evaluation and operational use, it was not all that
unusual for Navy personnel to recognize a need for an improvement or
new weapon, to design and manufacture the weapon within the Navy
establishment, and for the conceivers and/or producers to take the
weapon to sea for test and evaluation. If a deficiency in ordnance design
was noted, it was often corrected on the spot by shipboard gunners.
To a certain extent, a similar path was followed in the introduction
of electronic devices to naval warships. Radio was developed as a result
of the intense desires of men to exchange intelligence as rapidly as
possible over long distances without physical interconnections. Until
the present century, a ship's isolation was complete once she navigated
out of port and sailed over the horizon. Of course, ships in company or
in passing "spoke" to each other by voice hail, or signal flags by day,
and lanterns at night. But once at sea, orders or instructions from
higher commands not in company could not be easily altered. For want
of better communications, major battles have been fought after peace
treaties were signed.
The U. S. Navy, in keeping with its traditional scientific leadership,
early recognized the impact of radio on naval operations. Only by such
means of communication could far- scattered forces be effectively
directed. Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, while a lieutenant, experimented




before Marconi's successful application. During Fiske's investigations,
he discovered the principles of degaussing ships as a protection against
mines (used widely in World War II), and designed a system of radio
control of torpedoes which forms the basis for the modern "radio"
guided missile. Thus in the early days of electronics, Navy personnel
often followed advanced concepts from a glimmering thought to useful
hardware aboard ships.
Prior to World War II, ordnance, electronics and communications
were more or less separate and individual functions aboard ship. A new
gun or electronic (radio) device could be developed, tested, evaluated,
and placed in an operational status aboard ship in relative isolation.
That is, weapons were weapons, and radios were radios, and there was
little marriage between them.
During the 1930 's the governments of Great Britain, the United
States, and Germany fostered experiments to create a reliable detector
that would locate airplanes not visible to the naked eye. The sound-
detectors that had been used for this purpose had become almost use-
less when the increasing speed of airplanes made it necessary for the
gunners to "lead" their direction indicators by 20 degrees or more when
firing. Although all three of the countries named were active in the
development of radar, Great Britain led because it had the most to
fear from air attacks.
Radar was soon integrated with the fire control function of gunnery,
since it provided a more sure method of determining ranges than optical
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instruments and worked regardless of night, fog, or distance. The
marriage of radar to gunnery in the area of fire control and the increas-
ing swiftness of naval engagements, especially sea-air battles, brought
into existence a new organization, the CIC or combat information center,
on warships. The CIC filtered out the multitude of items of information
that came in from the radar, spotting planes, sonar, and so on, reducing
them to manageable proportions to enable the commanding officer to
make intelligent decisions.
Supersonic jets, greater threats from other surface units, and
advancements in submarine warfare soon overran the man-machine
interface present in CIC during much of World War II and the Korean
War. Computers were introduced as an aid to commanders in their
information gathering and decision-making processes. Application of
the computer in naval weapons systems has advanced to the point where
man-machine interface has been minimized to the point where in many
instances human resources are no longer required.
Throughout the course of history, the development of weapons has
been extremely slow. It is said that until 1000 A.D., weapons had a
useful life of about 400 years. Today, the useful life span of a weapon
system may only be from 3 to 7 years before rendered obsolete by
emerging technology or enemy advances. The design, development,
test and evaluation phases of weapon-system acquisition have become
increasingly important as the useful life span of weapons has decreased.
20 '

It is the speed of development, test and evaluation which largely deter-
mines the extent to which the system design incorporates the latest
technical advances.
B. WEAPON SYSTEM CONCEPTS
The concept of a weapon system has come into being rather recently
in naval history, evolving from ordnance, radio, radar and fire control
to the point where a weapon system is made up of a number of unique,
specialized components which must be integrated to achieve overall
effectiveness. Ordnance Pamphlet (OP) 3000 defines a weapon system
as "a collection of integrated components or subsystems which perform
the interrelated functions necessary to render the desired effect on the
enemy. " Recent thinking has further integrated weapon systems into
naval ships by dividing a ship into a containment system and a combat
system. The containment system is viewed as the ship structure and
related housekeeping systems, e. g. , the hull, damage control, laundry
and messes. The combat system is thought of as being the command
and control, navigation, external communications, weapon and other
supporting systems used directly for target surveillance, target recogni-
tion, electronic countermeasures, weapon delivery, weapon handling
and storage, and weapon safety. The complete combat system does
not consist of the physical equipment alone, but also of technical manuals,
training plans and equipment, spare parts, of an optimum employment
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doctrine, and the human resources necessary to pursue objectives.
Weapons system procurement thus includes concurrent development,
test and evaluation of all of these items.
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III. EVOLUTION OF TEST fc EVALUATION CONCEPTS
A. UP TO McNAMARA AND 1961
From the perspective of Test and Evaluation, the weapon acquisition
strategies which evolved within the Navy prior to the appointment of
Secretary McNamara in 1961 suffered from a number of problems which
paralleled those of planning and budgeting. For example, funds for
adequate testing were often not available and test results were seldom
available in time to influence the major program decisions which shaped
the character and quantity of systems. Procurement of weapon systems
was production orientated, with test and evaluation taking the back seat
to hardware. Each major weapon subsystem was tested individually
prior to shipboard deployment. The first time all interacting subsystems
were tested as a single functioning system was after shipboard installation.
Increasing system complexity and the requirement for the combat system
to function under semi-automatic central control in a shipboard environ-
ment was not mirrored in total system test and evaluation concepts.
In conjunction with shortcomings in test and evaluation concepts,
the government in the late 50's and early 60's regarded military procure-
ment efforts as very risky and therefore used the cost-plus-fixed-fee
type of contract for this work. During this period centralized govern-
mental planning and direction of military procurement programs were
lacking. As a result, many duplicative approaches were funded to
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meet poorly conceived military requirements. Programs were initiated
without adequate evaluation of the time and cost required to complete
them, and performance and reliability requirements were often left to
the contractors to define after contract awards had been made. In this
atmosphere, schedule slippages and cost overruns of 200% to 300% were
typical, and many programs were cancelled before completion because
of infeasibility, obsolescence, or excessive cost.
Elements of each service sought funding for programs that would
enhance their own military role. Funds usually being in short supply,
the procuring service would often encourage the contractor to bid un-
realistically low by revealing the amount of money available for the
project. In an effort to get hardware out of the factory and aboard ship,
test and evaluation programs were often shortened or completely chopped
from the procurement cycle. It remained for untrained sailors on board
ship to discover that the weapon systems fell short of filling the require-
ment for which they were originally procured.
The nature of the contractors with whom the services were dealing
also were going through changes. In years past, the Navy dealt with
contractors who were actually producers. These were real technical
people with responsibility but who were on a first name basis with Navy
personnel. These people had been at sea and knew the bow from the
stern of a ship. The Navy could expect technical performance from




During this time period, for a variety of complex reasons, most
defense contractors were moving toward conglomerate corporations.
The Navy no longer talked with owner-operators. They talked to cor-
porate executives who often knew little about building ships and weapon
systems but were interested in cash flow and return on investment. They
were often lacking in detailed technical knowledge of weapons, having
reached their management position through other channels, but were very
good about discussing concepts such as schedules and costs. They may
have known the cost impact of a proposed change, but they didn't know the
other ramifications.
Since the contracts were the cost-plus -fixed-fee types and the con-
tractor was assured of recovering his full cost, the contractor often was
willing to bid well below the probable final cost in competing for the
contract. Both the service and the contractor hoped that after the initial
money was spent, the government would be so committed to the program
that it would provide successively greater increments of funding rather
than cancel it. A similar "liars contest" was conducted regarding the
project schedule. If the government wanted the equipment by a certain
date, the contractor was willing to commit himself to provide the equip-
ment by that date, regardless of the chances of doing it, again often at





When Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of Defense, he launched
a series of changes in the government's decision-making processes and
in weapon- system contracting procedures which profoundly and rapidly
affected the defense industry environment. He began by centralizing
much of the authority to initiate programs in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. To avoid duplication of procurement in the services, he
utilized the concept of Systems Analysis, which was to select among
competing programs. He placed government budgeting on a five-year
basis to permit appraisal of the total financial impact of major programs
spanning a number of years. He required contractors to plan their
activities thoroughly before the government approved the program
funding.
To dissuade contractors from accepting unrealistic contracts and to
encourage efficient performance after award, McNamara curtailed the
use of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. To motivate contractors to design
weapon systems having low production costs, and to discourage them
from bidding low on weapon system contracts in the hope of making it up
in the subsequent sole- source production contracts he authorized the use
of "Total Package Procurement" contracts in which the development,
test and evaluation, production, and support of weapon systems were




The Pentagon's new policy was bound to cause great difficulties for
the defense industry, accustomed as it was to the old way of doing
business. Its problems were complicated by the failure of the Defense
Department to adapt completely to its changed role. DOD was weak, for
example, in estimating program costs and in predicting how much test
and evaluation was necessary to reduce uncertainty in weapon system
procurement to a manageable level. Policies established at high levels
were not understood, implemented, or enforced at lower levels. The
bureaucracy was doing a very poor job of defining the documentation
necessary to implement the new procedures.
Because the contractors were accustomed to telling their customers
what they wanted to hear about delivery dates, program cost, and prod-
uct performance, they found it almost impossible to bring themselves to
challenge the government's preliminary plans. Yet this kind of confronta.
tion was one of the major objectives of the contract definition phase of
Total Package Procurement.
Contractors, would, for example, consider the Pentagon's requested
delivery dates as sacred, and tried somehow to schedule the design,
development, test and evaluation, and production into the available time.
They tended to make cost and technical appraisals by automatically
accepting government requirements for the various elements of the
system and program -- rather than by estimating each element's cost
or technical performance individually, then summarizing them to
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obtain an independent appraisal of total system performance and total
program cost.
As a result, the weapon system procurement plans were not much
more realistic than those formerly submitted by contractors, when they
simply told the services whatever would help them "sell" the programs
further up the line. As in former years, when schedule and/or cost
crunches arose, one of the first areas to be lopped off was the area of
test and evaluation in an effort to get the hardware delivered. Paper
studies were often substituted for actual test and evaluation of end
product items. In short, contractors often signed fixed-price, total-
package contracts at prices below the expected cost, containing risks
that were not thoroughly appraised, and for which they lacked the
management disciplines necessary to perform the work in an efficient
manner.
C. GET WELL PROGRAMS
Efforts to correct problems related to test and evaluation (T&E)
were started in the late Sixties. These efforts were greatly accelerated
with the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (BRDP) of July 1970,
and various T&E measures taken during calendar 1971 to deal with the
issues raised by the BRDP.
1. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's Findings
The following excerpt is quoted from the BRDP section on




Everyone seems to agree that Operational Testing and
Evaluation (OT&E) is very important; however, there are significant
differences of opinion as to what it encompasses, what its proper objec-
tives are, and what organization and methods are necessary to accom-
plish it most effectively.
It has been customary to think of OT&E in terms of physical
testing (under various designations such as operational suitability
testing, employment testing, service testing, or field experimentation).
It is essential to recognize that the primary goal of OT&E is operational
evaluation, and that while operational testing is very important it is only
one method of evaluation. To be effective, OT&tE must be a total pro-
cess, using all appropriate methods of evaluation, which spans the
entire cycle of a system from initial requirement until it is phased out
of the operational forces. If OT&E were limited to physical testing, it
would lose much of its opportunity to contribute to decisions on whether
to produce a system, and would seldom be able even to influence the
system's characteristics and capabilities in any major way.
Much OT&E does, however, involve physical testing and,
therefor, it is important to distinguish between "functional" testing and
"operation" testing.
Functional testing (often engineering testing) ((termed "Develop-
ment Testing" in this Guide)) is done to determine how well various
systems and materiel meet design and performance contractual specif-
ications --in other words, whether they meet technical requirements.
By and large, functional testing in and for the Department of
Defense appears to be well understood and faithfully executed. Serious
policy deficiencies are not apparent, and such failures in functional
testing as occur can be primarily attributed to lack of technical com-
petence, oversight,' or procedural breakdowns. Functional testing is
not considered to be a major problem area.
Operational testing, on the other hand, is done to determine to
the extent possible whether such systems and material can meet opera-
tional requirements. It must provide advance knowledge as to what
their capabilities and limitations will be when they are subjected to the
stresses of the environment for which they were designed (usually
combat). Operational testing must take into account the interface with
other systems and equipment, tactics and techniques, organizational
arrangements, and the human skills and frailties of the eventual users.
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There has been an increasing desire, particularly at OSD level,
to use data from OT&E to assist in the decision-making process. Un-
questionably, it would be extremely useful to replace or support critical
assumptions and educated guesses with quantitative data obtained from
realistic and relevant operational testing.
Unfortunately, it has been almost impossible to obtain test
results which are directly applicable to decisions or useful for analyses.
Often test data do not exist. When they do, they frequently are derived
from tests which were poorly designed or conducted under insufficiently
controlled conditions to permit valid comparisons. It is especially
difficult to obtain test data in time to assist in decision-making. Sig-
nificant changes are essential if OT&E is to realize its potential for
contributing to important decisions, particularly where the tests and
the decisions must cross Service lines.
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel made three recommendations on
improvement of T&E. While subsequent actions do not constitute rote
implementation of the letter of specific recommendations, they do con-
stitute substantial implementation of their spirit. BRDP recommenda-
tions called for establishment of a "Defense Test Agency" under the
control of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Test and Evaluation.
The rationale of these recommendations was (1) to make sure that
adequate testing was accomplished by an agency not under the control
of the people who were attempting to "sell" the system being tested and
(2) to provide an unfiltered channel for test-based information into the
major program decisions made by the Secretary of Defense at DSARC I
and DSARC II. A third recommendation called for a separate program
category for T&E. This measure was designed to prevent the use of
funds required for an adequate T&E to cover development cost overruns.
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2. Mr. Packard and the DSARC
One of the first things that Mr. David Packard of Hewlitt-
Packard realized when he came into DOD was the necessity for clarify-
ing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and his office vis-a-
vis those of the Service Secretaries and their staffs. He quickly decided
that there was a need for a very simple modus operandi by which the
OSD would establish policy and make decisions at appropriate points
and the military services would carry them out. Once having done its
part, the OSD would step back out of the way of the performing organiza-
tion. Furthermore, the various OSD offices, such as that of the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretaries for
Installations and Logistics, Systems Analysis, and Comptroller, should
lay out their spheres of responsibility and authority, subject, of course,
to Mr. Packard's approval.
In a Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 28 May
1970 entitled "Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition, "
Mr. Packard required the Services to develop and demonstrate the
operability of a weapons system by actual test prior to the commitment
of funds for production of a major system. Progress in meeting this
requirement is reviewed by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) at discrete stages during development. DSARC
determines whether the system is ready to advance to the next stage,
and then makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense concerning
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funding of the next stage. Generally these reviews are held prior to
initiation of 1) engineering development, 2) prototyping, and 3) system
production.
When the council considers the first two of the three major
decisions, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering chairs it.
For the third decision, he serves as a member, while the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics, who is responsible
for production and development, becomes the chairman. At this point,
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is the seller and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics is the
buyer.
After the DSARC finishes its deliberations, the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense makes a decision which holds unless new evidence
arises to change it. For example, usually the program goes ahead
smoothly until it runs into some kind of cost, schedule, or system-
performance problem. If any such difficulty causes the breaching of
established thresholds (i. e.
,
tolerances on critical program parameters
agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the responsible Service
Secretary), the program comes up for another examination by the
Secretary of Defense. Barring that kind of situation, the programs
are run by the Services and the Secretary of Defense stays out of them --
except to keep informed on their status through regular program




In his memo of 11 February 1971, "Conduct of Operational
Test and Evaluation, " Secretary Packard wrote:
Although each Service now has a somewhat different way of
organizing for operational test and evaluation, it is apparent to me
that this function can best be performed by an agency which is separate
and distinct from the developing command and which reports the results
of its test and evaluation efforts directly to the Chief of the Service.
Moreover, within the Service headquarters staff, there needs to be an
office with a clear OT&E identification to provide staff assistance
directly to the Service Chief and to provide a headquarters focal point
for the independent OT&E field agency. Thus, at the completion of
Operational Service Testing in the Army, OPEVAL, in the Navy, and
Cat III testing in the Air Force, I would expect that the respective
Service Chiefs would have a clear picture of the operational suitability
of a weapon system for Service use, to include its principal deficiencies
and limitations and the corrective actions required prior to full-scale
introduction into the force. Accordingly, each Service is requested to
restructure its organization for OT&E along the lines specified above.
As a second step, I am establishing a Deputy Director for Test
and Evaluation within ODDR&E with across the board responsibilities for
OSD in test and evaluation matters. This office will review and approve
test and evaluation plans prepared by the Services and will provide an
assessment of results obtained.
In his memo of 21 April 1971, Secretary Packard prescribed
measures to ensure the flow of T&E information into major program
decisions.
The DCP format focuses attention on relevant technical and
operational information through the identification of achievement mile-
stones. The function of the test and evaluation milestones is to insure
the availability of critical technical and operational data prior to each
major Defense System Acquisition Review Council action.
The newly-established Deputy Director, Defense Research
and Engineering (Test and Evaluation) will receive from the Military
Departments for review and comment, during the drafting of the initial
DCP, a brief (1-4 pages) statement of the critical questions or issues
which the development tests will address. The coordinated DCP for
DSARC Milestone I (Program Decision) will contain a condensed
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version of the critical questions or issues as well as the proposed
schedule of the major development test milestones for addressing them.
The DCP for DSARC Milestone II (Ratification Decision) will
refine the critical questions or issues associated with development test
and evaluation and will extend the process to include the critical ques-
tions or issues to be addressed during initial OT&E and the test sched-
ules therefor. At such time as the OT&E test plan is available, the
Deputy Director will review it to insure that the critical questions or
issues are adequately covered.
Prior to the DSARC Milestone III (Production Decision) the
Military Departments will provide the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering with an assessment of the test results in terms of
response to the initial questions or issues previously identified. The
Deputy Director, Test and Evaluation, will review this assessment
and provide an independent recommendation to the DSARC Milestone
III meeting.
3. Department of Defense Directive 5000. 1
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000. 1, Acquisition
of Major Defense Systems, the cornerstone of the Navy's comprehensive
new acquisition policy, was the culmination of a concerted effort to
identify the underlying causes of unsuccessful acquisition experiences
and to prompt whatever improvements were deemed necessary. While
DODD 5000. 1 addresses major weapon system programs, the manage-
ment principles on which it is based are applicable to all programs.
The directive formally establishes the DSARC. It takes a strong
position on the decentralization of high-level controls in regard to the
day-to-day aspects of acquisition, and it establishes the concept of a
powerful, less encumbered program manager. Finally, DODD 5000. 1




In the area of test and evaluation, paragraphs III. C. 5 and 6
apply directly and are as follows:
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed.
Progressive commitments of resources which incur program risk will
be made only when confidence in program outcome is sufficiently high
to warrant going ahead. Models, mock-ups and system hardware will
be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level.
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible.
A determination of operational suitability, including logistic support
requirements, will be made prior to large-scale production commit-
ments, making use of the most realistic test environment possible and
the best representation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be evaluated and presented
to the DSARC at the time of the production decision.
4. More Guidance From Mr. Packard
Secretary Packard's memo of 3 August 1971, "Test and
Evaluation in Systems Acquisition Process, " amplified the guidance
of his 11 February and 21 April memos in part as follows:
The objective of the overall operational test and evaluation
effort for any program is to aid in providing at major decision points
in the acquisition and development process the best information possible
at that point in time as to: the military utility of the prospective system;
its expected operational effectiveness, operational suitability (including
reliability, logistic, and training requirements); need for modification;
and the organization, doctrine and tactics for system deployment.
For programs intended for acquisition, phases of operational test and
evaluation must be successfully executed in a timely manner to provide
needed information as required.
New acquisition programs requiring DSARC processing, or
those which are currently in their early stages, will be so executed
that an initial phase of operational test and evaluation will be accomp-
lished prior to the major production decision to assist in estimating
system operational effectiveness and suitability before that decision.
a. This initial operational test and evaluation will be
accomplished with operational personnel in as realistic an operating
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environment as possible and, where practical, will use pilot or early-
production items.
The accomplishment of initial operational test and
evaluation as a prerequisite for production decision does not obviate
the necessity for completing operational test and evaluation when the
production articles are introduced into the operating forces.
5. From the Deputy DDR&E(T&E)
In a memorandum for the Assistant Directors, the Deputy
DDR&E(T&E) reviewed the three DepSecDef memos cited above and
outlined the following functions for his office:
In summary then, the Deputy Director Test & Evaluation
(DDT&E) (with the assistance of his staff) is to accomplish the following:
1. Have across-the-board responsibilities for test and
evaluation in the Department of Defense. Review test and evaluation
policies and procedures of the DOD and the Military Departments and
recommend changes as appropriate.
2. Monitor closely test and evaluation programs conducted
by the Services for DSARC programs and such other programs as he
believes necessary throughout the entire testing cycle. Report to the
DSARC and directly to DepSecDef at DSARC Milestones I and II his
assessment as to the adequacy of the list of critical issues and prob-
lems to be attacked by test and evaluation and the schedule of test
milestones, and report at Milestone III to the DSARC and to the Dep-
SecDef his independent recommendation.
3. Insure timely OT&E to meet the intent of DepSecDef's
direction described in 2a above.
4. Request Service test plans and test results as may be
required to accomplish (1), (2), and (3) above as early as such plans
are developed by the Services and needed by DDT&E.
5. Initiate and coordinate appropriate joint testing.





7. Administer for OSD its responsibility for the national
and major Service ranges.
8. Carry out such other T&E related activities as the SecDef,
DepSecDef, DDR&E, or other DSARC member may direct.
6. More from The Deputy
LTGEN A. D. Starbird, the Deputy Director Defense Research
and Engineering for Test and Evaluation, in an address to the 7th Naval
Aviation Test and Evaluation Conference at NATC Patuxent River, Md.
,
on 24 August 1971 commented on the evolution of test and evaluation
concepts and emerging policies as follows:
a. As we all know the Military Departments and the DOD have
increasingly come into criticism in almost all phases of their activities.
Unfortunately, test and evaluation has not escaped. In fact, on many
occasions it has come in for severe criticism. Each time a system in
rather advanced stage of acquisition runs into trouble, there are critics
who center on inadequate test and evaluation as a major culprit.
b. It is interesting to me that the criticism of test and evalua-
tion has come from many different quarters. On occasion, the press
and the public have been critical. Congess in general has a sincere
interest in seeing that we do adequate test and evaluation and their
criticisms have been fairly frequent. The GAO has been critical,
much more so recently than in earlier years. The President's
Scientific Advisory Committee was asked to study out T&E and they
emerged with certain criticisms. Many of you are probably familiar
with the fact that the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, which
reported about a year ago, was quite critical of test and evaluation
and particularly the quality of the operational test and evaluation
accomplished by the Departments.
c. Some of the critics have called for rather radical changes
in how we do our T&E business. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, for
example, recommended: appointment of an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Test and Evaluation to have a strong hand in approving
Service test plans; and an OSD-level Test and Evaluation Agency to
carry out the more critical DOD program tests.
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We all realize that many of the criticisms leveled at our T&E
are just not justified. "We in the DOD have done in the past, and are
doing now, much excellent testing. The results in the effectiveness of
many of our complex systems show that our test and evaluation have
been good. We devote a tremendous amount of effort of the best people
and at high cost to test and evaluation. On balance, I believe that the
Services are on the par with any other large industry, and perhaps
ahead of most.
But we have had faults and some of those persist. For these
we are rightfully criticized. The faults in general fall in two categories.
First is the availability of test results. Frequently the testing
and its evaluation are completed long after critical decisions and major
expenditure of funds have been made. We are well into production
before we realize from tests that we will not reach the reliability goals
specified. We are well into deployment on occasion before we know
that we cannot maintain adequately. The first valid criticism then is
that much of our testing is not timely.
Second, our key testing to determine operational effectiveness
and suitability is often not accomplished until we are irrevocably
committed at large dollar cost to some particular design. We do not
accomplish early enough adequate operational test and evaluation.
There are many definitions of operational testing but I think we all
know what it means. It is testing of a product reasonably representa-
tive of the final design, by operational units, in the type of environment
the system will encounter when deployed, so as to establish its military
worth and operational suitability. Included in that matter of operational
suitability is whether its reliability requirements can be met and with-
out undue maintenance.
Secretary Laird and Secretary Packard have both been
extremely interested in our test and evaluation from the time they took
office with the Department of Defense. I remember two long sessions
within the first week after they were sworn in when they met during
most of one evening on a system for which I then had responsibility.
Both asked many, many questions dealing with test organizations,
test results and test plans. Both for many months have discussed
with the Service Secretaries and the Military Chiefs what steps were
necessary to accomplish improvements. Beginning early this calendar
year, they issued a series of three instructions indicating what changes
they desired to be made. The latest is the instruction by Secretary
Packard of 3 August to which I earlier referred. Reading these col-
lectively you can see that their objectives are really four in number.
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First, and I believe this their primary objective, they desire
to improve rather than revolutionize our test and evaluation approach.
They want to build on the good that exists rather than to start again
from scratch.
They want to avoid "adding testing just for testing's sake. "
They insist that everyone know the objective of their testing before
embarking on their test program.
They insist that the testing be timely, -- that it be adequate
and scheduled for evaluation in time to contribute to the major decisions
they must make. (I should point out that, for all important systems
being acquired by the Services, they must approve moving a program
from concept definition into advanced development, the subsequent
movement into engineering development, and the third and more
important decision to move into production. )
They insist too that the testing be realistic, that it be in
sufficient detail and adequately evaluated to give realistic answers.
7. T&E and The Congress
Congress, recognizing the importance of test and evaluation
in the procurement of weapons systems, enacted in Public Law 92-156
of November 17, 1971 a Section 506. A partial quote of that Section.as
applies to test and evaluation follows:
"Sec. 506. (a) Beginning with the calendar year 1972, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Congress each calendar year, at the
same time the President submits the Budget ... a written report
regarding development and procurement schedules for each weapon
system for which fund authorization is required . . . Beginning with the
calendar year 1973, there shall be included in the report data on
operational testing and evaluation for each such weapon system for
which funds for procurement are requested (other than funds requested
only for the procurement of units for operational testing and evaluation
and/or long lead-time items) . . .
"(b) A supplemental report shall be submitted to the
Congress by the Secretary of Defense not less than thirty nor more
than sixty days before the awarding of any contract or the exercising
of any option in a contract for the procurement of any such weapon
39

system (other than procurement of units for operational testing and
evaluation and/or long lead-time items) . . .
"(c) Any report required . . . shall include detailed and
summarized information with respect to each weapon system covered




the results of all operational testing and evaluation
up to the time of the submission of the report, or, if operational testing
and evaluation has not been conducted, a statement of the reasons there-
for and the results of such other testing and evaluation as has been
conducted. "
D. IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS
1. SECNAVINST 5000. 1
To implement DODD 5000. 1, the Navy issued SECNAVINST
5000. 1 and other flowdown directives which will be discussed later.
Paragraph 6e of the basic instruction assigns COMOPTEVFOR
(Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force) responsibility
as an independent test agency for weapon system acquisition required
T&E. It is interesting to note that enclosure (2) of the basic instruction
canceled 28 previous instructions, of which three had T&E in their
titles.
Enclosure (3) to the basic instruction entitled "Policy,
Relationships and Responsibilities" contains the real meat of system
acquisition direction within the Navy. For designated projects (Major
Defense Systems such as those in Selected Acquisition Reports), the
mode of operation for Project Managers is prescribed. The Project
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Manager is directed to establish coordination with the DRDT&E
(Director, Research, Development Test and Evaluation) to ensure
adequate operational test planning and operational test and evaluation
accomplishment. Section II of enclosure (3) indicates that test and
evaluation is to be a consideration in RDT&E conceptual effort, full-
scale development, and preproduction. Paragraph II. C. 2. b. states
that programs will not normally be proposed to the DSARC for SECDEF
approval for production prior to completion of requisite operational
test and evaluation. Deviations to prescribed T&E can be made only
by or with the concurrence of the SECNAV.
Section II, "Program Considerations, " in paragraph D
further spells out T&E policy as follows:
1. The wide variety of naval weapons dictates varying
approaches to the conduct of test and evaluation; such effort shall be
tailored to the needs and characterizations of each individual acquisi-
tion -- prime consideration being given to adequate operationally
oriented testing. Normally, the following general sequence of events
should prevail; (1) laboratory/contractor preliminary test and evalua-
tion of breadboard of demonstration hardware during the conceptual
effort, (2) contractor/development activity test and evaluation of sub-
systems and/or full-scale demonstrator hardware during full-scale
development, (3) technical test and evaluation conducted by the con-
tractor with Navy/Marine Corps participation during pre-production/
production, (4) IOT&E (Initial Operational Test and Evaluation) by or
with the active participation of Navy operational forces prior to the
major production decision, (5) Navy/Marine Corps OPEVAL (Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation) prior to approval for service use and
inventory acceptance (except for ships), (6) Navy /Marine Corps
follow-on test and evaluation, and (7) the conduct of tests and evalua-
tions by the Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS) and recommendation
to the Chief of Naval Operations for service acceptability. Test and
evaluation effort shall be effectively correlated with previously out-
lined requirements concerning approval of material for service use.
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Specifically, the procedural aspects of requirements determination,
research and development, manufacture of service test model(s), tech-
nical evaluation, initial operational test and evaluation, full operational
evaluation, and approval for service use shall be correlated.
2. New acquisition includes conversions, major modifications
and modernizations. Adequate test and evaluation of these is also
required
3. For new acquisitions . . . the principles of early operational
test and evaluation before production decision, participation by the
Marine Corps or COMOPTEVFOR shall apply. The purpose of IOT&E
and other tests is to provide assessments and recommendations by an
activity independent from the development activity concerning the future
operational suitability of systems under development.
4. The objective of the overall operational test and evaluation
effort for any program is to aid in providing, at major decision points in
the development and acquisition process, the best information possible
at that point in time as to: the military utility of the prospective system;
its expected operational effectiveness, operational suitability (including
reliability, maintainability, simplicity, logistic, and training require-
ments); need for modifications; and the organization, doctrine and
tactics for system deployment . . .
2. Congressional Concern
Concurrent with the issuance of DODD 5000. 1 and the Navy's
implementing instruction SECNAV 5000. 1, there was increasing Con-
gressional concern over testing of major acquisitions. Because of the
major problems encountered with weapons programs as a result of
inadequate testing, Congressional committees increasingly qualified
the authorization of resources assigned to programs until comprehen-
sive testing had been completed. Following are some examples from
the fiscal year 1971 and 1972 authorizing appropriations to illustrate
this increased interest by the Congress. The restraints applied most
42 ( \

often occur during requests by the services to place a major weapon
in full-scale production.
In Public Law 91-441, dated October 7, 1970, the Congress
stated that:
Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the
procurement of the F-lll aircraft, $283, 000, 000, of such amount may
not be obligated or expended for the procurement of such aircraft until
and unless the Secretary of Defense has (1) determined that the F-lll
aircraft has been subjected to and successfully completed a comprehen-
sive structural integrity test program . . .
In House Report 92-232 on authorization appropriations for
fiscal year 1972, SRAM and MAVERICK were discussed.
The AGM-69A SRAM is an air launched air-to-surface missile for
planned use on the B-52G/H and FB-111 aircraft. The SRAM missile
is equipped with a nuclear warhead designed to attack targets defended
by sophisticated defense systems. The fiscal year 1972 program pro-
vides for proceeding to full-scale production considering completion of
testing.
MAVERICK is an air-to-surface Air Force missile, electro-optically
guided for use against small hard targets such as tanks and bunkers.
Last year the Congress, on the recommendation of the Committee on
Armed Services, denied requested procurement funds for MAVERICK
and directed that the program be continued in research and development
to avoid concurrency and to allow more reliable development and test
results prior to initiating procurement.
3. T&E and the GAO
At the request of the Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the General Accounting Office (GAO) made
a review of the importance of testing and evaluation by the Department
2
of Defense in the acquisition process for major weapon systems.
2
The Importance of Testing and Evaluation in the Acquisition Process
for Major Weapons Systems, The Comptroller General of the United
States, 7 August 1972.
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Their report indicates that the benefit of testing is accomplished
through properly assessing risks and delivering test results to the
decision-maker at key points in the acquisition cycle when final de-
cisions must be made. Testing at decisive stages of development was
found to show where problems exist and to help military managers
make sound decisions affecting future production and purchase of
weapons than would otherwise be possible.
The GAO reviewed 13 weapon systems with estimated total
costs of more than $46 billion. They included such weapons as the
Army's improved HAWK missile, the Navy's DE-1052 (destroyer
escort), and the Air Force's F-15 aircraft. On the basis of its ob-
servations of the pattern of testing performance, the GAO concluded
that:
--Practices used to establish objectives for testing generally were
adequate.
--Most weapon systems did not have adequate plans for conducting
tests.
--Testing and evaluation for most weapon systems was not accomplished
in a timely manner.
--Most test reports were adequate, but their value was diminished due
to inadequate test planning and actual testing. Some reporting im-
provements could be made.
--Complete and valid test and evaluation data was not available prior
to those times in the acquisition cycle when decisions had to be
made.
Based on DOD's listing of five phases in the acquisition
process of weapon systems (1 concept formulation, 2 validation and
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ratification, 3 development, 4 production, and 5 deployment) the
GAO formulated a model (Appendix A) to depict the role of testing in
the acquisition cycle. The purpose of GAO's model was to reinforce
and emphasize certain ideal concepts of testing and evaluation in the
acquisition process, as follows:
--Testing and evaluation is an important ingredient throughout the
acquisition process.
--The sequential nature of engineering; acceptance; and, to some
degree, operational suitability testing and evaluation.
--The responsibility for the success of testing and evaluation through-
out the acquisition process lies with the developer, the user, and
the contractor in different degrees and at different times.
--To provide a means for DOD and weapon systems program managers
to evaluate the testing and evaluation process in their respective
programs.
4. Laird's Viewpoint
In his final report to the House Armed Service Committee on
January 8, 1973, Secretary Melvin Laird indicated that with the help of
David Packard, many changes had been made in the weapons system
acquisition process but that it would take some years before the im-
provements would be fully validated. He indicated that bankrupt prac-
tices such as total package procurement and an indiscriminate use of
concurrency between development and production had been eliminated.
His substitutes included "test before you fly" and "fly before you buy"





In January 1973, the several earlier T&E memoranda were
superseded by DOD Directive 5000. 3 entitled "Test and Evaluation. "
It was in somewhat more detail and tightened to a degree the earlier
memoranda instructions:
--It stated certain principles that should apply to all acquisition pro-
grams. T&E would start as early as possible and be conducted in
phases so as to eliminate risks early. Acquisition schedules must
be keyed to accomplishing T&E milestones before major added
resource commitments were made. Prior to contracting for major
production, there would be completed: sufficient development test-
ing (DT&E) to insure that all design problems were identified and
solutions were in hand; and sufficient operational testing (OT&E) to
provide a valid estimate of operational effectiveness and suitability.
--In each Service, OT&E would be the responsibility of a field agency
independent of the developing command. Typical military operating/
maintaining personnel and units were to carry out the test, -- not
highly trained development technicians. Such operational testing
was to be conducted in a simulated operational environment where
the stresses of real combat operations (such as fatigue and counter-
measures) were applied to the degree possible.
--Operational tests preferably were to be separate from development
tests. However, an early phase of operational testing could be
46

combined with a development test providing the combined test was
participated in and accepted by both the developer and the independent
operational test agency as satisfying their individual requirements.
Pilot production items were to be used wherever possible for the
development and operational testing completed before commitment
to major production. However, final prototypes could be employed
where these prototypes were truly like the expected production items.
--For T&E of ships of a major class it was recognized that because
of the long design, engineering, and construction period, completion
of T&E prior to the decision to proceed with follow ships would not
in all likelihood be possible. "In lieu thereof, successive phases of
DT&E and OT&E will be accomplished as early as practicable at test
installations ... to minimize the need for modification to follow
ships. " Use of prototypes to achieve T&E prior to the first major
production decision on follow ships is advocated.
--The directive included an important new provision with respect to
waiving satisfactory completion of required T&E. For each major
acquisition program, the describing Development Concept Paper
(DCP) sets forth such required T&E and only the Secretary of
Defense can waive its accomplishment.
6. OPNAVIN5T 3660. 8
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3660.8 of 22 January 1973 established
guidance and policy for T&E of Navy systems and equipments in
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accordance with the requirements of SECNAVINST 5000. 1 and DODD
5000. 3. The instruction reemphasizes that Navy weapon system ac-
quisitions shall provide for T&E programs to (1) permit a clear deter-
mination of service acceptability and suitability by competent authority;
(2) support the development activities in evolving a design which meets
specifications and service requirements; (3) support the Secretary of
Defense review and decision process.
It recognized that conventional ship programs may be large,
complex and prolonged evolutions. Consequently, development T&E
required on a specified subsystem or groups of subsystems may be
conducted on board other class ships or at land-based test sites. In
the case of a new hull or propulsion designs prototypes, or land-based
test sites, construction is normally undertaken to verify laboratory
DT&E.
While previous instructions and directives addressed T&E in
general terms, 3960. 8 defines T&E specifically and discusses T&E of
weapons systems in the following areas: developmental testing, opera-
tional testing, and acceptance trials. The following pertinent definitions
are made:
TEST: Any program or procedure which is designed to obtain, verify,
or provide data for the evaluation of; research and development; pro-
gress in accomplishing development objectives; or performance and




DEVELOPMENTAL TEST AND EVALUATION (DT&E): Test and
evaluation performed by or for the developing agency which emphasizes
the technological and engineering aspects of the system, subsystem, or
equipment items. Normally carried out under strictly controlled
conditions.
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (OT&E): Tests and evalua-
tions participated in or performed by operational personnel focusing on
operational effectiveness and suitability (including reliability, compat-
ibility, interoperability, maintainability, and supportability). It also
includes the development of optimum operational tactics for systems
and equipment being developed for service use.
OT&E is further broken down into the following areas:
INITIAL OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (IOT&E): That
T&E accomplished prior to the DSARC Milestone III or comparable
CNO or CHNAVMAT first major production decision point to permit
assessment of the operational effectiveness and suitability of a weapon
system.
FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (FOT&E):
The continuing operational test and evaluation of a weapon system con-
ducted in an operational environment by operational personnel using
production systems for the purpose of verifying system performance;
validating correction of deficiencies previously identified; and refining
tactical employment doctrine and requirements for personnel and
training. FOT&E may be initiated using pilot or pre-production sys-
tems which most closely resemble the production units until the latter
items are available.
A comprehensive set of definitions of terms and phrases
commonly used in T&E, checklists for T&E in support of milestones
I through III of the DSARC process, and a diagram of the acquisition
process are provided as enclosures. T&E responsibilities and
relationships which have evolved are also discussed which will be the
subject of the following section of this thesis.
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7. NAVMAT NOTICE 3960
NAVMAT NOTICE 3960 of 1 February 1973, "Test and Evalua-
tion Policy for Major Surface Combatant Ships Project, " assigned the
Major Surface Combatant Ships Project Manager, PM 18, responsibility
for T&E effort within the Naval Material Command relating to major
surface combatant ships. The ship classes include DLGN 36, DLGN 38,
DG, DD 963, LHA, PF, SCS, and CVAN 68.
The Notice recognized that in the past, ship acquisition T&E
philosophy had been tailored to the needs and production approach of
each individual ship program. In light of recent DOD policy for major
weapon acquisitions establishing more standard criteria for the approval
of programs (DCP/DSARC), a need for adoption of more uniform T&E
procedures was recognized. Guidelines for test planning are provided
in conjunction with the PM-18 functional organization. Test processes
and relationships in test design, development and execution are
provided.
The requirement for a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
as initial policy in T&E for major surface-combatant acquisition pro-
grams was laid on. The TEMP is to be keyed to acquisition milestones
and should cover all T&E requirements through the production phase
including follow-on operational testing. It should include development
of the maintenance and ship-overhaul baseline test program for the
equipment and system-level Planned Maintenance System (PMS).
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It directed that test planning should be total-ship oriented to assure
adequate coverage of all work breakdown structure groups and to
assure that all systems are properly installed and completely operable,
before a ship is presented for Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS)
trials. Additionally, a Total Ship Test Director (TSTD) responsible
for planning and execution of the T&E program is required for each
program.
8. NAVMATINST 3960.6
NAVMAT INSTRUCTION 3960.6 of 24 August 1973, "Planning
and Implementation of Tests and Evaluations of New Weapon Systems, "
provides further guidance and direction for preparing the TEMP.
Under this instruction, the TEMP is considered to be a management
document and serves as a foundation for the more detailed DT&E and
IOT&E plans. Its basic elements are objectives, issues, responsibil-
ities, interfaces and schedules. It should be viewed as a planning
document rather than a control document.
9. NAVMATINST 3960. XX
NAVMATINST 3960. XX, a draft instruction of 21 December
1973, is presently under review within NAVMAT. The instruction,
"Test and Evaluation of Ship Acquisition, " has been prepared to
formalize NAVMAT policies and procedures for ship acquisition T&E
in order not only to respond to DOD and OPNAV requirements but
also to provide coordination and standardized approach to the develop-
ment of test requirements and the supporting test documentation.
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The Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) is assigned
the responsibility for developing from appropriate OPNAV design
requirements and his own risk analyses the test requirements neces-
sary to reduce ship acquisition risks.
Enclosure (1) to this instruction, "Management Plan for Total
Ship Test Program for Ship Acquisition, " prescribes the basic manage-
ment structure and procedures to be followed for developing test
documentation that will satisfy the objectives of ship acquisition T&E
and will also support the total ship test program (TSTP) for active
fleet ships. This enclosure is a comprehensive document that attempts
to bring together within a single cover T&E organization and responsibil-
ities, test documentation requirements, and development of a ship
construction integrated test package. It is against this background
that the proposed and on-going T&E efforts of the Patrol Frigate
project will be compared and analyzed in this thesis.
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IV. SOME PROTOTYPING CONSIDERATIONS
A. GENERAL
Navy prototyping is still evolving in the fly-before-buy era. It is
based primarily on past experience with prototyping and Total Package
Procurement. It is also influenced by the procedural and standardiza-
tion guidance received on a continuing basis from the DOD as developed
in the previous chapter. The literature concerning weapon system
acquisition, DOD and Navy Instruction, and various memoranda are
filled with positive statements concerning the use and advantages of
prototypes. These statements take the form of:
David Packard, "We want to put more reliance on hardware and less
on paper studies in advanced development. "
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
,
"We desire to emphasize the use of
prototypes. "
Barry J. Shillito, "Under prototype development, we will evaluate
hardware rather than paper promises in choosing a contractor. "
CAPT E. J. Otth, SHAPM for the Patrol Frigate Acquisition, "We
expect to use a land-based test site for the combat system as well as
the propulsion system to enable us to verify integration and perform-
ance of these systems in an environment more controlled and less
costly than aboard ship. "
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Early in 1974, discussions with Mr. Matthew T. Reynolds,
NAVMAT's point of contact in PM 18 for all T&E matters relating to
major surface ships, indicated that trends in prototyping of combat
systems in new ship- class acquisitions had reached the point where
prototyping was essentially mandatory. At least at this point of time
in acquisition philosophy, prototyping is an "in" concept. Therefore,
what prototyping is and what expected gains and costs are incurred in
its use are of considerable interest.
Conventional wisdom has it that a prototype is a redundant and
often costly adjunct to the design and development process. This thesis
considers the proposition that under given circumstances the most
effective way of resolving some of the uncertainties of combat system
development is by building and testing a prototype system at a land-
based test site. Underlying the discussion is the premise that no single
specified pattern of behavior can adequately provide for all of the con-
tingencies that will arise in the course of combat system development.
Additionally, the premise that cost and the long lead and production
times involved in ship construction do not permit the prototyping of
entire ships prior to production decision points is accepted without
argument or further comment. The combat system portion of the
total ship is broken out as a prime candidate for prototyping in contrast






To many people, the word "prototype" evokes images of the 1930's
and the 1940's, suggesting the angularity of a biplane, the quaintness
of goggles, and the hum of electronic equipment patched together with
tape and spliced wires. But what is being discussed here is some-
thing quite different; a vehicle for lessening technological uncertainty.
It might be more appropriate to call that vehicle a definition-phase test
combat system or perhaps a demonstrator combat system, rather than
a combat-system land-based test site, if only to deter prejudgement
concerning the utility of using a land system to emulate shipboard
systems. But prudence suggests merely defining the term as it is to
be used here and leaving language reform for another occasion.
There are many possible themes in any consideration of the use
of prototypes in development. The hypothesis from which this thesis
reasons is that: (1) establishing the detailed configuration of a new
combat system requires many decisions, each difficult, and each
dependent on the resolution -- or avoidance -- of uncertainty; (2) the
elemental substance of T&E is error and uncertainty, and delay in the
detection and correction of error or oversight is a principal cause of
inefficiency or ineffectiveness of development; (3) the early resolution
of uncertainties in technology, objectives, schedules, and costs is
vital, there are various ways of resolving such uncertainties, and a
technique of resolution most appropriate to the problem at hand should
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be chosen; and (4) in some circumstances, which can be defined, the
most desirable way of resolving technological uncertainty in ship
acquisition programs may be to build and test a prototype combat
system.
There are many definitions of "prototype" and little profit in laying
them end to end for scrutiny. Basically this thesis will consider a
prototype combat system to be a hardware-software combination
approximating, in full scale, the main features of a prospective opera-
tional combat system. Land-based tests must yield information that
will permit the timely identification and resolution of technological
uncertainties and ultimately support a sound decision about the procure-
ment of production systems. Additionally, the-prototype may be used
to suggest ways the design, structure and development of the combat
system can best accommodate the shipbuilder's requirements for
detailing the design of cabling and ducting, assess maintenance require-
ments, and be useful throughout the life-cycle of the production system
as a test and configuration bed. Owing to the nature of a prototype, it
is not very likely that all prospective subsystems will be available as
early as selected hardware items, and some simulations may have to
be used in place of other items.
C. WHEN TO PROTOTYPE
The following figure (p. 57 ) presents some concepts for considera-
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moderate some of the uncertainty that characterizes the decision
process. Because a prototype is a full scale, semi-operable representa-
Hon of what is intended to be in time an operational combat system,
decisions buttressed by experience with prototypes tend to be founded
on less tenuous technological grounds than those based on abstract
analysis and derived from assumptions. Reliance on prototypes appears
to be advantageous for four general classes of development decision.
(1) When there is uncertainty about the advisability of producing a
given combat system, testing a prototype will provide reliable informa-
tion about the attributes of the combat system and will reduce the
quantity and importance of misgivings. (2) When there is uncertainty
about which of two similar hardware/ software combinations to produce,
testing subsystems built by different contractors will ease the decision.
In the same vein, if cost overrun's or technical inadequacy of subsys-
tems causes fall back to other equipment, a prototype lends a suitable
means for incorporating these emerging configuration changes.
(3) When there is uncertainty about which combat system to build,
testing prototypes, liberally supported with realistic simulations, will
provide hard information on which a choice can be based. (4) When
there is uncertainty about the technological feasibility of a configura-
tion, prototype testing can assist in resolving the main issues.
The matter of whether a prototype program is inherently more or
less costly than a program that bypasses the prototype option can be
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treated, for the moment, as incidental. It is apparent that cost and
schedule estimates derived in part from experience with prototype
combat systems will tend to be somewhat less uncertain than estimates
based solely on analytical predictions of development progress. From
the fact that specific uncertainties of technology, configuration, and
probable mission responsiveness will be moderated by the very exist-
ence of a prototype, it may be adduced that a prototype strategy can be
used as a means of preserving a production option -- putting off a final
decision until requirements of technology are better understood while
concurrently working toward that understanding.
There is no inherent reason why "Total Package Procurement, "
should not include a prototype phase if the "total package" decision
specified quantities and schedules but made configuration definition a
function of an evaluation process following prototype testing. Or, for
that matter, "total package" could be interpreted to mean all develop-
ment and production activity following a definition phase that provided
for building and testing prototypes. Within current thinking however,
a prototype provides a vehicle to "test before flying, " and "flying
before buying. "
A prototype should be built in the expectation of change, and the
expectation of change is its only substantial justification. The objec-
tive of building a prototype is to discover what changes are necessary -
what decisions must be made -- before a design is committed to
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production, or to discover if any number of changes will end in a
desirable production combat system. Such a characterization does
not invalidate the use of prototypes to aid in resolving mission uncer-
tainty or to aid in equipment/contractor selection or to contribute to a
decision on which (rather than what) to produce, but it emphasizes the
contribution of a prototype to the diminution of uncertainty, whatever
the nature of that uncertainty.
From such assumptions arise two principles for the conduct of
programs based on the use of prototypes: (1) controlled investment --
that is, obtaining an informational return at an expenditure commen-
surate with the worth of the information, and (2) defining and limiting
uncertainty, which is to say, having the principal features of a combat
system reasonably well defined before undertaking construction. Al-
though planners may squirm at the thought, there is no obvious reason
for specifying the detailed operational assignment of a combat system
while a prototype is being built and tested; the question of whether it
should have one or two digital computers cannot be put off in the same
way. Flexibility however, must be built into the system to enable
modification to reasonably expected equipment and/or threats in the
planning future.
A prototype combat system should not be expected to resolve
uncertainties that are peripheral to the main purpose of building it,
nor should peripheral uncertainties be permitted to dominate a
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prototype program. Technical problems that can readily be identified
and solved by analysis and discrete off-site testing should not be left
to a prototype test inquiry. Nor should very great technical uncertain-
ties be left for resolution by means of a prototype combat system.
Basic technological feasibility is not an issue that can be satisfactorily
resolved at the prototype level; feasibility demonstrations cannot be
put off until operational requirements begin to hinge on their success.
A prototype is not a specific vehicle for uncovering "unks-unks" nor
for resolving basic policy differences between contributing factions.
When the time or urgency of a requirement is in doubt and it is
possible to select between two courses, one of study and proposal and
the other of build and test, the relative advantages of the two should
be very carefully evaluated. If a prototype can be built for not much
more than the cost of conducting an extended analysis, a prototype
seems preferable because it can be expected to produce more reliable
information than a study. If such information becomes available in
advance of a production decision, the lead time between production
decision and availability of operational combat systems will be lessened
by the amount of "learning time" that would otherwise follow a decision
to produce a combat system only defined on paper. Indeed, the per-
formance of the prototype in land-based trials may not only enhance
the validity of acquisition decisions, it may also solidify them, as a
decision based on an existing prototype will generally contain less
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residual uncertainty than one based solely on analysis of engineering
expectations.
In essence, then, the construction of prototype land-based combat
systems can provide a hedge against requirements (strategic) uncer-
tainty. It does so by permitting a more certain resolution of techno-
logical uncertainties than can design studies, no matter how elegant
they are. The central fact is that under almost any conceivable circum-
stances the transition from design proposal to first lot of production
articles brings on change, and change introduces new uncertainties.
Some are uncertainties that can be resolved with no particular difficulty
while production continues. The function of a prototype is to permit
the early identification of previously unrecognized problems and the
resolution of recognized uncertainties that might, if they went undetec-
ted, precipitate major changes in the performance, cost, or avail-
ability of specific weapon systems.
Adhering to the principles described above would be difficult in
any circumstance. It is very difficult today. The pressures for early
commitment to production are enormous. The customer, in this in-
stance, the Navy, is conditioned by the military environment to be
less interested in the comprehensive resolution of uncertainty than
in the early delivery of operational ships and combat systems. There
is a natural tendency to assume that all problems will be little ones.
In this situation the producer has very little motivation for investing
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time and money in a prototype. Profits come from production. Firms
are not paid very well for military development. Contractors would
rather build what are incorrectly called "production prototypes" than
"development prototypes, " because a "production prototype" implies
a strong commitment to production while a "development prototype"
represents a proposal of which the faults, if any, are all too evident.
Here again, when a "production prototype" is built the producer will
be optimistic about the possibility of solving all problems early and,
as has been observed, the customer is anxious to believe such re-
assurances.
Some critics and defense-industry experts recently (January 1974)
have stated that a prototype, as a preproduction step, tends to blur the
line between development and full production, enabling the Services
to move systems into production a little bit at a time. In another vein,
others argue that a preproduction prototype gives congressional critics
more time to attack. The presumably higher price tag is an argument
against building the ship/combat system which in turn is dysfunctional
to the service who is trying to abide by directives and test before buy
concepts.
D. DOD, THE NAVY AND PROTOTYPING
The DOD's current philosophy is that the use of prototypes must
be increased in all development efforts to reduce costs and resolve
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uncertainties prior to major production commitments. DOD has
broken prototypes into three categories as follows:
1. Experimental --to demonstrate technological feasibility.
2. Developmental --to gain sufficient confidence before
comitting a system to full-scale development.
3. Production --to prove out the system, tools and methods
prior to quantity production.
The DOD normally recognizes three approaches to prototyping,
which are in most cases applied to experimental and developmental
prototypes. They are as follows:
1. Sole/single source -- prototypes developed and fabricated
by a single developer.
2. Competitive -- prototypes involving the same technology,
developed and fabricated by two or more developers. ti
3. Complementary -- prototypes involving different tech-
nologies, developed and fabricated by two or more developers in
response to the same basic requirement.
The breakdown and extent of prototyping per se is broken out as
follows
:
1. Component -- part of an assembly of parts to perform a
function.
2. Subsystem --a major functional assembly of a system.
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3. Hybrid --a system of equipment based upon an alteration
or change to an existing system or equipment.
4. "Bare-bones" model -- a system or equipment containing
only its minimum essential elements.
5. Complete system --a combination of subsystems that
makes up the ultimate system or equipment.
As should be seen from the above, prototyping can take many forms
and seek many ends. To achieve a completely successful and highly
efficient set of prototype terminology is one of the important goals
which the Navy feels must be achieved, if it is to be successful in im-
plementing recent prototyping policies. The figure below depicts what
appears to be the direction the Navy is going in its efforts to comply
with guidance from DOD on prototyping and defense system acquisition
in achieving a set (or body) or prototype terminology which can be




























A word of caution is in order when applying any so-called guide
such as that in the previous figure. The purpose of such a guide is
to enhance understanding and communication, not to impose a rigid set
of rules which will do more harm than good. The best example avail-
able is probably that of shipbuilding, whereby a period of several years
will be required for transition from present methods of shipbuilding to
the sequential "fly-before-buy" approach, even for ships in the 5,000-ton
category. For larger ships such as carriers, the Navy must and will
look for innovative ways to comply with the spirit of new prototype, test,
evaluation and acquisition policies, but an idealized sequential program
plan will not be attainable in all cases.
Likewise, the figure should not be interpreted to mean that each
and every step must be accomplished in each and every program. As
a general rule, when determining whether certain steps may be omitted
or not, development prototypes should not be required when the tech-
nology has been "hardware" demonstrated in some other program or by
experimental prototypes. Neither should production prototypes be
required when engineering change proposals of a minor nature can be
made to "off the shelf" or "in production" defense systems of another
Service.
F. SUMMARY
The central thesis of this chapter is that in certain circumstances
it is sensible to build and test a prototype of a combat system before
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finally deciding to produce it in quantity. Such circumstances can occur
if the technological risks inherent in the design are substantial and can-
not be reduced to manageable proportions by analysis alone. The dif-
ficulty of deciding when to adopt a prototype strategy arises from the
necessity of deciding a priori how substantial are the technological,
mission assignment, or source-selection risks.
The circumstances under which the construction of a prototype
combat system becomes a desirable element of the total development
program include:
1. A program sufficiently well defined to permit developers
to undertake the resolution of specific technological uncertainties that
cannot realistically be expected to succumb to alternative techniques
of uncertainty resolution (such as analysis and simulations) or that
can be alternatively resolved only at greater cost than by the prototype
route. (Build a complete ship only to discover that the combat system
doesn't operate properly. )
2. When developers understand that the real purpose of a
prototype combat system is to identify necessary design changes
quickly and accurately, and that one outcome of a prototype program
can be a decision not to proceed to production. The object of a proto-
type is to permit a prompt and economical decision in such matters.
The real payoff which the Navy expects to achieve in prototyping
programs can only be realized if thorough cost analysis and test and
evaluation is conducted, reported and utilized by source selection
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boards, project managers, contract negotiators, and high-level
decision makers at every sequential step in the defense system ac-
quisition process. The remainder of this thesis explores the efforts
of the Patrol Frigate program to accomplish these objectives.
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V. THE PATROL FRIGATE'S TEST AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
A. GENERAL
The Patrol Frigate Ship Acquisition Program was chosen as an
example of ongoing T&E and prototyping efforts because of the avail-
ability of information, the cooperation extended by Project Office
personnel, and several unique features of the acquisition program
itself which lend application to subsequent ship procurement programs.
The PF is also the first major ship acquisition program to come under
the auspices of DODI 5000. 1, DODI 5000. 3, and additional T&E guide-
lines developed in Chapter 3.
B. PATROL FRIGATE SHIP HIGHLIGHTS
1. Objective of the PF Program
The objective of the PF program is to acquire for the late
1970's- 1980's timescale a class of ships capable of ensuring our use
of essential sea lines of communications. It is intended that these
ships will provide, at least cost, the necessary improvement in the
Navy's surface combatant capability to:
Defend non-carrier forces against airborne forces
Conduct ASW operations




2. Ship and Program Constraints
The PF is an austere escort ship designed toward the major
program goals initially imposed by CNO, as follows:
Average follow ship cost (without escalation) not exceeding
$45.7 million (FY 73 dollars).
Full load displacement not exceeding 3400 tons
Total personnel accommodations not exceeding 185.
In order to meet the cost constraints, weapons and sensors
requiring research and development have not been included in the PF
design, at least in theory. Ensuring approval for service use of major
individual equipments and systems has been made the responsibility of
the Systems Commanders, NAVSHIPS, NAVORD, etc.
It is intended that the PF will operate in conjunction with other
sea control forces and not as an independent unit. Hence the PF has ,
been designed to supplement the capability of other ships rather than
operate in a stand-alone capacity.
3. Mission Requirements
To ensure our use of essential sea lines of communication
against the contemporary and postulated threats along with planned
and existing escort forces, Development Concept Paper #97 of 3 April
1973 requires the PF to be able to:
Provide self-defense and operate as part of an ASW
screen defending the escorted force or operate on picket station in
support of the escorted forces.
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Operate in conjunction with other escorts to provide area
and close-in AAW defense of the escorted force and self-defense
against aircraft and airborne anti-shipping missiles.
Provide for defense of the escorted force and own ship
against hostile surface ships to over-the-horizon ranges.
Operate in conjunction with other forces in open ocean
ASW operations and subsurface surveillance.
Supplement area AAW forces in the detection and engage-
ment of airborne threats.
Enforce blockades and operate offensively in conjunction
with other forces against mercantile shipping and naval forces.
Provide for SAR, surveillance and evacuation operations
and establish a naval presence.
t
- The PF is not intended to serve as a carrier force escort
or in high-threat areas.
4. PF Combat System Components




-76mm Oto Melara Gun





-Mk 13 Guided Missile Launcher (Fires Harpoon or Standard Missiles)
-Mk 32 Torpedo Tubes
FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM
-Mk 92 (STIR) Two Channel System
SENSOR
-SPS-49 Air Search Radar
-SPS-55 Surface Search Radar
-SQS-56 Sonar
-Passive ESM System
COMBINED SENSOR AND WEAPONS DELIVERY
-Two LAMPS Helicopters
The required capability of the above systems elements has
-
-beenpreviously established and it is required that their integration .--
into a single combat system shall in no way adversely alter these
established capabilities.
5. PF Procurement Phasing
A contract has been awarded to Bath Iron Works Corporation
to build the lead ship. Contracts for follow- ship procurements are
tentatively to be in two batches of 24 and 25 each over a five-year
period. Ship deliveries are to be at the rate of about one per month,
with the lead ship being delivered in June 1977 and the last ship of the
second block in the 1981-1982 timeframe.
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C. PATROL FRIGATE T&E PROGRAM
The T&E phases for the PF are considered to be Developmental
Test and Evaluation (DT&E), Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
and Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E). OT&E is
further broken down into Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E)
and Follow-on Test and Evaluation (FOT&E).
DT&E is viewed as a class of tests and evaluations for the specific
purpose of facilitating the evolution of the ship system and is conducted
under the sponsorship of the Developing Agency. For the PF, DT&E
is that portion of land-based test site testing concerned with installation
and integration of the combat systems in addition to that developmental
testing to be conducted in support of the individual equipments. Integra-
tion of the combat system is considered to be a "Risk Watch List" item,
i.e., -failure to achieve satisfactory integration at the test site would
adversely affect DSARC III presentation. Integration of the Combat
System is to be proved at the test site prior to DSARC III.
IOT&tE for the PF consists of two separate areas. First, the
individual equipment/systems of the "Risk Watch List" in the DCP
are to undergo separate IOT&E's. For instance, the Mk 92 fire con-
trol system is scheduled to undergo IOT&E on the USS TALBOT DEG-4
in September of 1974. Second, the integrated systems will undergo
IOT&E at the land-based test site. "Risk Watch List" systems which
will undergo individual IOT&E are:
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-Mk 92 FCS/MK 75 gun mount and 76 mm ammunition
-AN/SPS-49 Radar
-AN/SQS-56 Sonar
-HARPOON Fire Control System
The responsibility for initiating IOT&E for these systems lies
with the participating managers (FARM'S) managing the development
and procurement of their respective equipment. However, the T&E
Manager of the SHAPM's staff will closely monitor the test programs
to insure that PF test schedules can be met and that any problems or
deficiencies during the IOT&E's are taken into account.
IOTkE of the integrated systems at the Combat System Land-
Based Test Site (CSLBTS) is scheduled to begin in January 1975.
Naval personnel will be used to evaluate the systems. Accomplish-
ment of adequate IOT&E at the LBTS with satisfactory results is a
.
prerequisite for approval by DSARC of follow- ship procurement. As
such, the events and planning leading to IOT&E as well as IOT&E
itself will receive the closest attention of the OT&E Organization.
FOT&E will be addressed in detail by an FOT&E Plan which will
include the possible requirements and procedures for assigning the
lead ship to OPTEVFOR for a complete at-sea operational appraisal
prior to the ship's release for Fleet usage. This requirement was




The Navy is requested to develop a plan for, and evaluate the
impact of assigning the lead PF to OPTEVFOR for a reasonable period
to complete an at-sea operational appraisal of the PF as a whole prior
to the lead ship's full release for Fleet usage. This plan and evalua-
tion, together with the Navy's recommendations, should be submitted
to OSD at the time of preparation of the revision to the DCP for initia-
tion of construction of the first follow ship.
The impact of this assignment will be evaluated and an evaluation
report will be prepared by the T&E Planning Group for submission to
the CNO. The FOT&E Plan and the evaluation report will be com-
pleted prior to the DSARC III milestone.
PAT&E for the PF is functionally separated into three areas.
These areas are documentation certification at the LBTS's, acceptance,
testing and documentation validation on the lead ship, and acceptance
testing on the follow ships. Detailed information on the PAT&E is
contained in the Ship Test Management Plan of 15 November 1972.
Documentation certification at the LBTS's will consist of actual
conduct of test procedures for the installed equipments /systems.
Such use will enable test procedures to be corrected if needed and
certified prior to use on the lead ship. More will be said about
"certification" in a later section of this thesis.
On the lead ship, the certified procedures will be used to conduct
the tests leading to validation of the procedures and acceptance of
the shipbuilder's efforts. Test procedures for those equipments and
systems which were not certified at the LBTS will also be validated
on the lead ship. The validated documentation from the lead ship
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will then be supplied to follow shipbuilders. Follow-ship testing will
use validated test procedures for test conduct leading to Navy accept-
ance of the shipbuilder effort.
i
D. PATROL FRIGATE TEST ORGANIZATION
The Patrol Frigate Ship Acquisition Project Manager has established
a Total Ship Test Program, and the organization for its accomplishment
for the Patrol Frigate. The organization that will be used by the Patrol
Frigate to develop test documentation is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The
principal members of the organization are identified in this section.
Specific responsibilities are elaborated in the next section.
1. Ship Acquisition Project Manager
The Ship Acquisition Project Manager (PMS-399) is respon-
sible to the Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command and the Major
Surface Combatant Ship Project Manager (PM-18) for the Patrol Frigate
Ship Acquisition.
2. Test and Evaluation Manager
The Test and Evaluation Manager (PMS-399T) is responsible
to the SHAPM for the successful conduct of the PF Total Ship Test
Program.
3. Total Ship Test Director
The Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Bath, Maine has been
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development of ship test documentation and its validation on the Lead
Ship.
4. Engineering System Test Development Director
The Naval Ship Engineering Center, Philadelphia Division has
been designated as the Engineering System Test Development Director,
with the responsibility for the development of the Hull, Machinery and
Electrical (H/M/E) test documentation.
. 5. Combat System Test Development Director
Naval Ships Weapon System Engineering Station, Norfolk
Detachment has been designated as the Combat System Test Develop-
ment Director with overall responsibility for the development of Com-
bat System test documentation.
6. Test Development Managers
The Test Development Managers under direction of the Combat
System Test Development Director, provide test documentation for
specific subsystems of the Combat System.
7. Combat System Integration Manager
The Combat System Integration Manager, PMS-399. 13, is
responsible for successful integration of the elements of the PFCS
and the provision of system level test documentation for the testing
of the lead and follow ships.
8. Officer-In- Charge Combat System Land- Based Test Site
The Officer-In- Charge of the Combat System Land Based
Test Site coordinates activities at the Combat System Land Based
79 I

Test Site with specific responsibilities as described in the next
section.
9. Lead Shipbuilder
Bath Iron Works (BIW) has been selected as the Lead Ship-
builder. In that capacity the preparation of various items of test
documentation and ship test performance are within their responsibility.
10. Combat System Integration Support Contractor
The Naval Ship System Command has entered into a contract
with Sperry Systems Management, Sperry Rand Corporation, as the
Combat System Integration Support Contractor to assist the Combat
,
System Integration Manager (CSIM) in the providing of system level
test documentation.
E. PATROL FRIGATE TEST ORGANIZATION
1. Introduction
The PF SHAPM has established a Total Ship Test Program
for the Patrol Frigate in accordance with existing regulations and
which appears in the Patrol Frigate Ship Test Management Plan. This
program is to provide for comprehensive tests which will determine
the status of equipment readiness during construction and the life-cycle
of the ship. The organization that will be used by the PF to develop
test documentation is identified in the previous section. Detailed




2. Ship Acquisition Project Manager
The SHAPM provides guidance as necessary to the T&E
Manager in the areas of planning, budgeting, developing, and apprais-
ing ship test documentation. The SHAPM is responsible for the PF
Ship Acquisition Program and will provide guidance as necessary to
the T&E Manager for the implementation of the Total Ship Test Program
(TSTP).
3. Test and Evaluation Manager
The Test and Evaluation Manager (PMS-399T) is responsible
for the successful conduct of the Patrol Frigate TSTP with specific
responsibilities for:
-Successful conduct of the T&E Program
-Generation of the test sections of the Follow Ship
Specifications
-Test of the Lead and Follow Ships
-Development and maintenance of the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan and Ship Test Management Plan
-Analysis and feedback of the results of testing into ship
design
-Development and maintenance of documentation for the
testing of Lead and Follow Ships
-Compliance with T&E policy established by the Major Sur-
face Combatant Ship Project Manager (PM-18) and the
Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command.
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4. Total Ship Test Director (TSTD)
The Total Ship Test Director is responsible to the SHAPM
through the T&E Manager for coordinating the development ship test
documentation and its validation on the Lead Ship.
The TSTD has specific responsibilities to:
-Manage the development of an Integrated Test Package to
ensure that the Follow Shipbuilders comply with the Ship-
building and Performance Specifications.
-Manage the development of a test package for the life-cycle
testing of the PF.
-Prepare and forward Quarterly Progress Reports and
Exception Reports.
-Supervise the conduct of testing of the Lead Ship during
construction at Bath Iron Works.
-Validate Test Procedures during the testing of the Lead Ship.
-Direct the review and revision of the test sections of the
Lead Shipbuilding Specifications and the Test Documentation
Booklet for use in the Follow Ship Request for Proposal.
-Direct the activities of the Combat System and Engineering
System Test Development Directors in accomplishing the
above tasks.
-Submit schedule and budget data to the PF T&E Manager.
-Maintain a configuration control program to ensure avail-




5. Engineering System Test Development Director (ESTDD)
The ESTDD has specific responsibilities to:
-Accomplish tasks assigned by the TSTD for development of
the Test Index and Test Outlines for Contractor Furnished
Equipment for the Lead and Follow Ship Test Programs.
-Provide technical assistance for liaison and monitoring
during Engineering System test documentation validation on
the Lead Ship.
-Many other duties relating to H/M/E tests beyond the scope
of this thesis.
6. Combat System Test Development Director (CSTDD)
The CSTDD has specific responsibilities to:
-Accomplish tasks assigned by the TSTD for development of
Combat System test documentation for the Lead and Follow
Ship Test Programs.
-Provide for on-site liaison and monitoring during Combat
System test documentation validation on the Lead Ship.
-Review the Integrated Test Package and recommend which
Combat System Test Procedures are suitable for conversion
into Maintenance Requirement Cards for inclusion in the
Planned Maintenance Subsystem.
-Provide for on-site witness of the conduct of tests at the
CSLBTS and certifying the correctness of Test Procedures.
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-As directed by the TSTD, participation in the review, and
recommend revision, of the test sections of the Lead Ship-
building Specifications and the Test Documentation Booklet
applicable to the Combat System for use in the Follow Ship
Request for Proposal.
-Monitor development of Combat Systems Test Procedures and
outlines.
-Review all Combat System test documentation to ensure its
technical accuracy and adequacy to support the ship test
process.
-Prepare schedule and budget recommendations for the Lead
Ship Test Program.
7. Test Development Managers (TDMs)
The TDMs are responsible for organizing, planning, managing,
and controlling the development of specific subsystem test documentation
for the Combat System. The TDMs are responsible for:
-Managing the development of all equipment and subsystem
test procedures for equipment under their cognizance.
-Reviewing Test Procedures for technical accuracy and
content.
-Managing the development of special and at-sea trial Test
Procedures for external communications, ASW systems,
LAMPS, and Harpoon Weapon System, where applicable.
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-Ensuring the generation, review, and modification of the
Test Index, Test Outlines, and Test Sequence Networks for
equipment under their cognizance.
-When directed by the CSTDD, acting as certifying agents at
the CSLBTS and validating agents on the Lead Ship for the
certification and validation of test documentation for equip-
ments under their cognizance.
-Providing solutions to test problems encountered during the
conduct of testing at the CSLBTS and onboard the Lead Ship.
The Officer-In- Charge (OIC) CSLBTS and the TSTD have
been given authority by the SHAPM to make interim changes
to Test Procedures during testing at the CSLBTS and onboard
the Lead Ship respectively.
8. Combat System Integration Manager (CSIM)
The CSIM's principal function is to insure the successful
integration of the PF Combat System. His primary responsibilities in
support of the Ship Test Program, are as follows:
-Provision of special and at-sea trial Test Procedures for
certification at the CSLBTS and for eventual Lead and Follow
Ship testing as applicable.
-Revision of CSLBTS Test Procedures for Lead Ship applicabil-






-Development of Test Procedures for Combat System com-
ponents installed in Follow Ships and not in the Lead Ship.
9. Lead Shipbuilder
The Lead Shipbuilder is responsible for the following Ship
Test actions in accordance with his Contract:
-Review the Test Documentation Booklet and prepare revisions
to equipment, subsystem, system and special test outlines as
necessary to ensure accuracy and adequacy of Ship Test
Program.
-Develop Test Procedures for Contractor Furnished Standard-
ized equipments.
-Develop Test Memoranda for CFE.
-Conduct Combat System equipment, subsystem, system and
special test procedures onboard the Lead Ship. Deficiencies
shall be brought to the attention of the SUPSHIP, Bath.
10. Officer-In- Charge Combat System Land-Based Test Site
(QIC CSLBTS)
The OIC CSLBTS is responsible to the SHAPM, through the
Technical Director, for the overall management and operation of the
Navy assets at the CSLBTS. In support of the Ship Test Program, he
has the responsibility to:
-Demonstrate, where feasible, Combat System test procedures




-Schedule tests and demonstrations.
-Supervise the evaluation of proposed changes to Combat
System Test Procedures at the LBTS.
11. Combat System Integration Support Contractor
Test responsibilities of Sperry Systems Management as the
Combat System Integration Support Contractor includes:
-Develop unique subsystem, system and special Test Pro-
cedures for the Combat System, initially for use at the
LBTS and eventually for use during the Ship Test Program.
-Provide maintenance assistance and engineering support
during certification of equipment, subsystem, system and
special Combat System Ship Test Procedures at the LBTS.
-Evaluate proposed changes to Combat System Test Pro-
cedures at the LBTS and forward results with recommenda-
tions to the TSTD via the CSTDD.
-Provide the TSTD technical support if required during the
conduct of Test Procedures on the Combat System for both
the Lead Ship and Follow Ships.
Highlights of the present Navy contract with Sperry Systems
Management will be provided in a subsequent chapter of this thesis.
F. CONCLUSIONS
Requirements set forth in DODD 5000. 1 and current Navy Depart-
ment Directives provide the required Patrol Frigate test and evaluation
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guidance with which to establish a ship/system T&E approach which
demonstrates, at various decision points, sufficient confidence for
follow- ship commitments. The PMS 399 organization for T&E has the
capability of providing for successful acquisition of 50 mission- capable
Patrol Frigates with performance-validated ship's crews, ship's
hardware and software.
Effective implementation of the PF T&E program concept requires
centralized authority and responsibility in one agency acting for and
under the direction of the SHAPM. This has been provided by a
Test and Evaluation Manager. One caveat however, is in order and
is in reference to behavioral considerations of participative manage-
ment as employed by the PF T&E organization. The SHAPM's T&E
organization is predominately a military/ civil service organization
and its managers have had a lifetime in military and government affairs., ,.«
In such organizations it is often a rule not to bring up problems that do
not already have apparent solutions. The essence of participative
management in the PF T&E program is openness and freedom of
exchange of both problems and problem solutions. Centralized top
management seeks this, but it does not come naturally and requires
perceptive treatment by all who are involved.
Another area in which the PF program is vulnerable stems from
the ever increasing number of Congressional, DOD and Navy -mandated
programs. Previous chapters have dealt with T&E aspects. Similar
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forces are at work in other areas such as integrated logistic support,
value engineering, surplus labor area selection, small business with-
holds and shipbuilding. Across the board PMS 399 is particularly-
vulnerable to those programs which are aimed at increasing centraliza-
tion of weapon system procurement. While PMS 399 will support these
programs, they have a significant impact on planning because they are
often of great scope, unfunded, absorb scarce and crucial resources,
and decrease the SHAPM's planning self-determination.
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VI. THE PATROL FRIGATE COMBAT SYSTEM
LAND-BASED TEST SITE
A. GENERAL
Land-based integration of the Patrol Frigate combat system is a
keystone of the PF T&E program. Prior to the production decision
(DSARC III), presently scheduled for March of 1975, the Land-Based
Test Site will be used to prove installation procedures to the maximum
extent practicable and to prove the mechanical and electrical compat-
ibility of the major equipments of the combat system. Additionally
the Combat System Preliminary System Operational Program will be
demonstrated at the CSLBTS. The Final Operational Program will be
debugged at the LBTS, after DSARC III, and will be demonstrated on-
board the lead ship after delivery.
Proofing of computer programs will be emphasized as a major
factor in achieving full utilization of the integrated combat system.
Engineering and functional analysis at the LBTS will lead to early
solution of integration problems that may be exposed.
An attempt will be made to address critical test and evaluation
questions and issues identified in the DCP such as:
-Are the individual combat subsystems which are to be incor-




-Is the integration of the various combat systems through their
respective interfaces adequate, in terms of data transfer characteristics
such as handling capacity, rate and quality, to meet operational
requirements?
-Do those operational characteristics of the integrated combat
system which can be estimated based on initial operational test and
evaluation, including reliability and maintainability test and evaluation,
show a reasonable probability that the ship class, when afloat, will be
able to satisfactorily accomplish the mission for which it was designed?
The use of a land-based test site as an aid in ship procurement is
not a new concept. As early as 1958 an ashore navigation center was
constructed by Sperry Systems Management Division in support of the
SSBN 598 class of submarine construction. Test sites employing
specific equipments are presently available at additional locations
such as Mare Island. However, the PFCSLBTS is the first site con-
structed which is dedicated to a single class of ship.
Recent experience with the DLGN-36 class procurement has re-
inforced the need for a dedicated test site. A review group under the
banner of the CNM recently (14 March 1974) completed an audit of the
problems found in the DLGN-36 combat system. Throughout the report
it is repeatedly pointed out that the lack of a LBTS seriously hampered
and delayed successful combat system integration.
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For the DLGN-36 procurement and others (DD-963, DE-1052 etc. ),
land-based testing was conducted on a fragmented subsystem basis.
Some subsystems were partially tested at Mare Island for instance,
and others at Dam Neck. In neither case was there a "full up" capa-
bility for testing the complete combat system. The first time the
major subsystems were all brought together at one place was aboard
ship. Since there was no land-based test site, the full up system
problems were not encountered until the advanced stages of shipboard
testing. Such is not the case for the PF procurement program.
B. PATROL FRIGATE LAND-BASED TEST SITE PHYSICAL PLANT
The LBTS is located at MacArthur Airport, Islip, New York. Its
primary initial function is to serve as a facility for the integration of
the combat system equipment and for training a U. S. Navy crew to
demonstrate the system prior to the PF production decision. It is
anticipated that, following the production decision, the LBTS will be
used for crew training, shipyard personnel training, computer program
verification, change verification, test program checkout, etc. The
LBTS will also be used for design and test of system modifications.
The building which houses the LBTS contains the physical mock-up
(PMU) compartments for the PFCS, the test facility for the Mk 92 FCS,
and facilities for support of these activities. In addition, the LBTS
contains the offices and classrooms required to support this plan.
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Appendix B depicts the location of the test site in relation to MacArthur
Field, a layout of the test site, a plan view of the CIC and sonar control
room, the CIC, IFF and sonar equipment room, the Mk-92 equipment
room, the STIR (Separate track and illuminate radar) equipment room,
the operations center (OCC), the program checkout area (PCA), and
the Mk-92 test site. Radar antennas are physically located on the
northern side of the test center in the approximate configuration that
they will appear onboard ship with the exception of height which is
limited by FAA regulations.
"The physical mock-up compartments will contain actual operating
-
equipment as well as simulators and mock-ups, and will represent the
precise configuration of the ships compartments. The CIC physical
mock-up contains functional communications circuits to enable the
simulation of tactical operations. The LBTS also employs functional
_
SPS-49, SPS-55 and Mk 92 Mod 2 CAS (combined antenna system) and
STIR radars. It is thus capable of detecting and tracking actual
aircraft. No capability exists, however, for actual subsurface targets
and only a limited capability exists for surface targets. Ships motion,
as well as air, surface, and subsurface targets can be simulated by an
OCC Console and inserted into the command and control element of
the combat system. Based on these simulated data inputs, the combat
system will develop CIC console scope presentations and data readouts
depicting test or tactical operation scenarios. Operator actions will
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result in selection and ordering of simulated weapons. During the
performance of the exercises, CIC operator actions and displayed
console data can be monitored, recorded, and evaluated through use
of closed circuit TV, PPI displays, data readouts, and recording
equipment on the OCC console.
The PMU is realistic to the point of being deceptive, and only the
lack of ships motion and the smell of salt air detract from almost
complete authenticity.
C. USES ENVISIONED FOR THE CSLBTS
1. DSARC III Demonstration
As previously stated, the primary short-range use of the
LBTS is to prepare a presentation for the production decision at
DSARC III. In fact, there are those close to the PF project who
believe that the production decision hinges almost completely on how
well the CSLBTS reacts to the scenarios during the presentation. In
preparation for this demonstration, a Navy crew is presently under-
going training under Sperry guidance to gain the knowledge and skills
necessary to demonstrate satisfactory operation of the PFCS during
the IOT&E demonstration. A limited number of COMOPTEVFOR
personnel will also attend this training.
2. Training
This training includes the following:
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-The characteristics of the PFCS and the LBTS, to include
system capabilities and limitations, mission, combat system
elements, subsystem elements and manning.
-Combat system functional data flow, including the signal
characteristics and time relationships.
-The IOT&E tests to be performed on the PFCS including
threats, test method and test procedures.
-The theory needed to support and understand the performance
of operational procedures, for detection, identification,
evaluation, weapon assignment and weapon control under
various threat conditions.
-The theory needed to perform operational trouble analysis
and fault isolation to the subsystem/equipment level by
employment of system operational tests and programmed
operational functional appraisals and by logical analysis
using maintenance documentation.
-Documentation and procedures to support system level
organizational maintenance.
-Ability to perform normal and casualty operations on an
assigned station with an acceptable probability of successful
target engagement, for each of the following scenarios:
--Power up, Condition 3.





--Single aircraft attack, Conditions 3 and 1.
--Single surface/near surface attack, Conditions 3 and 1.
--Single subsurface attack, Conditions 3 and 1.
--Multiple threat, Conditions 3 and 1.
--Casualty mode, Conditions 3 and 1.
-Ability to perform trouble analysis and fault isolation of
PFCS faults to the equipment level, using diagnostic computer
software and maintenance manuals.
-Ability to perform system level organizational maintenance.
-Ability to perform the IOT&E, with acceptable accuracy
and within specified time limits, using specified methods
and procedures.
The objectives of the lead shipbuilder course is to familiarize
shipbuilder personnel with the PFCS and to provide them with the unique
skills and knowledge required to install, integrate, and check out the
combat system on the Patrol Frigate. The follow shipbuilder course
will be the same as the lead shipbuilder course except for modifications
to accomplish curriculum improvement, as necessary to reflect ship-
board configurations, or as required by the follow shipbuilders.
As a training vehicle, the LBTS is limited by the following
considerations
:
-Until U. S. Navy certification 15 December 1974, priority of
use of facilities and equipment is assigned to engineering
development, system integration, and testing.
96 < \

-After 15 December 1974 and until IOT&E is completed,
priority of use will be assigned by the U. S. Navy OIC of the
LBTS.
-The LBTS equipment complement does not include all ship-
board CIC equipment. Simulation is provided in lieu of major
system inputs such as sonar, ECM, ships motion, and weapons
dynamics. Mock-ups are provided for major equipment found
in the shipboard configuration but not essential to combat
system IOT&E.
-Unscheduled (corrective) maintenance will be performed by-
Sperry engineering and contractor technical support rather
than U. S. Navy personnel.
-Deliberately faulted modules will not be available or authorized
for use in the system prior to or during the IOT&E.
3. General areas
The specifics of the majority of the tests to be conducted at
the LBTS are classified. However, the LBTS will be used as a test
bed to address the following type of questions:
-Can the PF develop attack data on submarines by the use of
active sonar while maintaining speeds up to X knots?
-Can the PF decoy passive acoustic homing torpedoes?
-Is the PF capable of employing ASW weapons to the effective




-Is the PF capable of controlling HS/VS/VP aircraft?
-Is the PF capable of detecting airborne threats by use of
radar?
-Can the PF detect and evaluate electromagnetic radiation?
-Is the PF capable of tracking and engaging fighter-bomber
type aircraft?
-Can the PF track and engage air, surface or sub-surface
launched anti- shipping missiles?
-Is the PF capable of engaging surface targets to over-the-
horizon ranges?
-Is the crew capable of performing all combat systems
operations?
-Is the crew capable of performing all combat system
maintenance tasks?
4. Documentation
One of the most difficult and expensive areas to manage in
the procurement of a new combat system is documentation, especially
at the system level. The PFCSLBTS will aid documentation as follows:
-Generation of publications engineering data and text.
-Verification of system documentation for builder and fleet
use
-System Documentation




--SMP's (System maintenance procedures)
--PMS (Planned maintenance system)
--System computer program and documentation
--System and equipment diagnostic computer programs
-Data flow and one-function diagrams.
5. Logistic support
Logistic support for equipments in combat systems are often
based on engineering data and test bench operation by equipment manu-
facturers. For the PF there is a Failure Data Collection, Analysis,
and Corrective Action Plan which is designed for the unique require-
ments of the Land Based Test Site while permitting the acceptance of
data from vendor facilities, shipbuilders, government sources and
eventual fleet operations. This plan incorporates failure data collec-
.
tion, failure analysis, corrective action, and failure reporting. Thus
it may be viewed as a dual-loop system whereby better logistic support
requirements may be determined initially based on LBTS data and in
the long run on a system whereby continuing assessment of support
requirements based on fleet data may be made.
6. Long term uses
Sperry's experience with the SSBN 598 class ashore-navigation
center seems to indicate that in the short run the configuration of a
given LBTS closely duplicates the class of ship for which it was built.
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As time goes on and other classes of ships come into being, there is a
tendency to modify existing LBTS to accommodate ashore testing of
new systems. In this regard, the LBTS is a vehicle to groom tactical
equipment, and verify installation test procedures and system computer
programs. It supports system improvement studies, development of
new system concepts, and analysis of advanced system computer pro-
gram concepts. In development areas, the LBTS may be used to test
and evaluate new operational techniques, system- equipment changes,
define change requirements, evaluate proposed changes, and to verify
shipalt/ordalt change documentation and accuracy.
7. Land-based Test Site Users
While the total spectrum of users of the PFCSLBTS can only
be determined after the fact, it is envisioned that many types of activi-
ties will use the LBTS to advantage. Users envisioned at the present
time include procurement decision makers, system designers, system
analysts, system programmers, equipment contractors and sub-
contractors, publication agencies, integrated logistic support personnel,
fleet personnel, field engineers, and shipbuilders. In addition, relia-
bility managers, those involved in quality assurance, and politicians
are sure to make use of the facilities available at the LBTS.
D. GOALS OF THE PATROL FRIGATE LAND-BASED TEST SITE
The initial goal of the PFCSLBTS is to adequately demonstrate the
viability of the proposed combat system to the DSARC at the production
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decision and thus support fleet requirements in the 1980's and 90's.
The other side of this goal, so to speak, has a negative connotation.
To wit, if the system is not viable, it will not be procured. Within the
initial goal, there are many subgoals present. These subgoals include
saving money and time, and to ensure design soundness, requirements,
and equipment system compatibility. Additional goals include the veri-
fication of publications such as system operating and maintenance pro-
cedures, and system computer programs. Finally, it is a goal of the
LBTS to provide the means to evaluate equipment performance and to
solve system technical problems before they develop in the fleet and
when they do, to provide a system to investigate and resolve them
quickly.
E. THE LAND-BASED TEST SITE CONTRACT
Sperry Systems Management, an operating unit of Sperry Division,
Sperry Rand Corporation, presently holds a $12 million dollar contract
with Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS) covering their effort in
support of the PFCSLBTS. Some highlights of that contract (#N0024-
73-C-1089) follow.
1. Test and Evaluation
Sperry Management Division is required to design, erect, and
operate the land-based test site. The LBTS is to be used as a facility
for integration and validation of the PF combat system prior to the
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PF production decision. The Mk 92 MOD 2 fire control system being
produced by the contractor under separate contract is the principal
element of the combat system. The CSLBTS will be used for acceptance
evaluation of the Mk 92 FCS and its subsequent integration with the GFE
elements, simulators, switchboards and ancillary equipments of the
PFCS for test validation and certification of the PFCS.
2. Construction of the LBTS
The LBTS is to include training facilities and the contractor
shall define and provide system simulators and programs required,
prepare equipment program specification, statements of work and all
other contractual documents necessary for procurement of the LBTS
construction. The contractor will check out simulation equipment and




Under direction of the Navy OIC of the LBTS, the contractor
is to provide a technical director to operate and maintain the LBTS
and PCA, as a development demonstration proofing site for the PFCS.
The contractor shall provide all facilities required by the OIC for the
LBTS to include provision for and maintenance of the office space
required by the OIC, provision for reproduction services, provision
for clerical and custodial services, provision and maintenance of




The contractor will be provided spare and repair parts as
determined by the government for government furnished equipment.
5. PFCS Integration and Test
The contractor shall integrate the Mk 92 MOD 2 FCS produced
by the contractor under separate contract with government furnished
computers, display, console sensor and other elements of the combat
system at the LBTS. The contractor is required to verify the integra-
tion of the combat system at the LBTS in accordance with a test plan
to be provided by the contractor and approved by the Navy. The test
plan shall be developed from an integrated test outline furnished by
the Navy and shall be directed toward the verifying of combat system
performance including the PFCS performance specification provided
by the Navy. The contractor shall provide all test maintenance, com-
puter support personnel, and such simulation programs as are required
for the performance of this task. The contractor shall also collect,
compile and analyze all data and prepare reports as required. The
contractor shall develop appropriate test plans for performance of the
IOT&E demonstration and submit the test plans for SHAPM approval.
6. LBTS Operation and Demonstration Support
The contractor shall support Navy personnel as required in
performing the IOT&E demonstration at the LBTS. The contractor
shall support other demonstrations and evaluations conducted at the
LBTS under direction of the OIC. The contractor shall staff and
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operate the LBTS facility under supervision of the OIC after completion
of the initial PFCS integration, testing, certification and IOT&E demon-
stration as a test development and training center. The facility will be
utilized to support the PFCS in all areas requiring the use of an opera-
tional test bed. Area use anticipated for the LBTS includes:
-Documentation development and verification
-Combat system crew training for follow ships
-Special demonstrations
-Investigation of combat system changes
-Prove out of ordalts and shipalts
-Fleet combat system problem investigation
-Integration of growth items
-Shipyard support.
7. Test Procedures
Utilizing the integrated test outline and the combat system
performance specification prepared by the Navy and furnished to the
contractor, the contractor shall prepare and maintain a current test
and evaluation plan, and a set of test procedures for use in the opera-
tion, test, evaluation and demonstration of the PFCS at the LBTS and
eventual use on the lead ship. The test plan and procedures shall cover
the following:
-Incoming inspection of GFE
-Unit test of GFE
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-Subsystem testing of GFE
-Integration of the Mk 92 MOD 2 FCS produced by the contractor
under another contract with material furnished under this con-
tract and the GFE in the LBTS.
-Combat system test demonstration at the LBTS.
8. SHAPM Support
The contractor is required to support the SHAPM in the
development, test and evaluation of the PFCS by maintaining control of
the configuration of the PFCS at the LBTS until satisfactory completion
of the IOT&E demonstration. The contractor is required to furnish
technical support to the lead ship builder in the design of the PFCS
compartments. He is required to assist the SHAPM in the resolution
of problems directly associated with the PFCS, specifically in the area
of integration analysis, documentation, ship test planning and develop-
ment, combat system reliability and maintainability and availability
analysis and evaluation.
The contract as outlined above expires in March of 1975 after
the scheduled DSARC III presentation. It is conjectured that the con-
tract will be extended on at least a yearly basis in support areas.
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VII. SOME PFCSLBTS CONCEPTS AMPLIFIED
A. GENERAL
Contracts, test plans, operating procedures and Congressional
testimony in general address the theoretical side of procurement;
what is planned or ought to be rather than what is. Since the Patrol
Frigate LBTS can be viewed as a prototype of land-based test sites
for future ship procurements, it is of interest to get behind the scenes
to the grass roots level of test site concepts. Information presented
in the following section is an attempt to document the beliefs, gut
feelings and thoughts of a myriad of individuals and commands contacted
and/or visited during research for this thesis. The author and the
author alone is responsible for the inferences contained herein.
B. A COLLAGE OF QUESTIONS INCLUDING A FEW ANSWERS
1. What working relationships have evolved between the LBTS
OIC and SHAPM (PMS-399), Sperry NAVPRO etc. in the three month
period the LBTS has been manned with Navy personnel?
The OIC's marching orders at this early point in the LBTS life
are essentially to get the job done. Since the concept of what the job is
is evolving in parallel to the LBTS, tasks have not been formalized
to any great extent, nor should they be. At the present time the OIC
has broad duties and freedom in his actions. He has submitted a
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one-page recommendation as to what his duties should entail, and
PMS-399 is in the process of integrating this input into a more formal
job description.
At the present time the OIC reports to NAVSHIPS as an OIC,
and to PMS 399 as PMS 399. 16, OIC of the PFCSLBTS. The NAVSHIP
reporting chain enables the OIC to receive support such as being on the
SNDL (Standard Navy Distribution List), have his own UIC (User Identi-
fication Code), and enables him to receive outside assistance that could
be cumbersome to receive via the SHAPM chain. The day-to-day chain
of command is through PMS-399 and it is through this chain that fitness,
reports will be generated.
The OIC is administratively supported by the NAVPRO office
at Sperry Great Neck, some 50 odd miles from the LBTS. This sup-
port presently takes the form of Naval communication support, NAV-
PRO PF/MK 92-2 contract inputs, and various other administrative
support items. The NAVPRO is administering the Mk 92-2 contract
with Sperry, but the PFCSLBTS contract is being administered by
contracting personnel on the SHAPM's staff and by NAVSHIPS 025.
The OIC's relationships with outside activities such as NAVSEC,
OPTEVFOR etc.
,
generally falls in the area of assisting Sperry Man-
agement Division in the prosecution of their contract. Informally, the
OIC assists whomever he can. For instance, assistance is being pro-
vided to NAVORD personnel in tracking NAVORD's portion of the Mk 92
procurement contract.
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The OIC is on a razor's edge between those who recognize
a need in the fleet for a ship weapons system such as the PF and those
who are test oriented, and at the extreme test for testing's sake. The
former group are equipment/production oriented and include both pro-
ducers of combat system equipment such as Sperry and operational
personnel who perceive that the system, albeit with short falls, is
better than what is presently in the fleet. The latter group, the "testers",
many times have to devote much time supporting the rationale of T&E
reports before GAO, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to prevent misinterpretation. The reporting of T&E results
culminates the T&E cycle and forms the basis for various decisions
concerning the future status of the weapon system. For example,
IOT&E reports are used by Congress as set forth in PL 92-156, and
by the DSARC as an input for the major production decision. They are
,
also used by COMOPTEVFOR to support the suitability of a proposed
system to meet fleet needs and operability requirements.
In view of the importance of T&E, different agencies have
different emphases in the conduct of the T&E. A grouping of the
thrust of T&E needs could be the cost-effectiveness group versus
operators and producers. Within the operator /equipment side, the
LBTS OIC as stated in Chapter V has authority to make changes.
Once the test group presents the OIC with a test plan for IOT&E and
DSARC III demonstration, the OIC becomes an instrument of the test
group and his ability to alter plans is severely limited.
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2. What authority does the OIC have within the boundaries of the
contract? What is his relationship to testing and test and evaluation
activities?
Authority to make changes in contractual obligations is
severely limited, as it should be, in that the OIC does not have the
resources to carry out complex changes. The OIC can make changes
that involve no change in the scope of the contract and upon which Navy-
direction is required. PMS-399 maintains centralized authority to
make contract changes.
Since the effort required to derive proper tests and test pro-
cedures was underway long before the OIC reported to the LBTS in
January 1974, the OIC had no input into test development. He has
however, become deeply involved in the evaluation of the CSOT (Combat
System Operability Test), which will be conducted by Navy personnel
both at the LBTS and throughout the life cycle of projected ships.
The OIC views testing at the LBTS as a three-phase effort
as follows:
-Tests leading up to Navy acceptance/certification of the
LBTS in December 1974. Sperry is conducting these tests based on
outlines supplied by the Navy. The purpose of these tests is to demon-




-IOT&E tests. The purpose of these tests is a demonstration
by the Navy to DOD and DSARC III of the operational characteristics of
the combat system. The tests will include scenarios, simulated air-
craft, and actual aircraft engagement. The OIC and Navy personnel
will conduct these tests. The tests will be developed by PMS-399,
APL (Applied Physics Laboratory), OPTEVFOR, and other agencies.
-Prove out and conduct lead ship tests. These tests, from
the Total Ship Test Program (TSTP), will be conducted to verify that
the lead ship can indeed be checked out and delivered in an up condition.
These tests will be conducted by the OIC and Navy personnel.
At various stages in the test phasing outlined above, different
agencies will be involved in the actual data collection, data reduction,
and analysis. These responsibilities are presently being considered.
3. What formal and informal relationship exists between the OIC
of the LBTS and other NAVPRO personnel?
There is no formal relationship such as one would find on an
organizational chart. The OIC is working with the NAVPRO toward
acceptance of the PFCS by the U. S. Government. There is presently
under preparation an agreement between NAVSHIPS and the Sperry
NAVPRO whereby the NAVPRO would be tasked to assist the OIC in
all technical matters relating to the LBTS.
4. What is the status of follow-on contracts with Sperry Manage-
ment for such things as life cycle support of the program?
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Review of the present contract and the substance of future
contracts will come under scrutiny in the fall of 1974. Unlike most
contracts, it is envisioned that the contract for life cycle support of
the program will be a multiple year contract.
The LBTS is viewed as a ship permanently home ported in
Sperry's building at MacArthur which the Navy runs. Sperry and other
industrial support is viewed much like what afloat units receive from
tenders and ship yards.
5. How will personnel be cycled through the LBTS for training?
A solid long range plan has not been developed at this point in
time. Up through IOT&E, there will be a crew of about 22 men includ-
ing three officers and one Wave resident at the LBTS. These people
will constitute the Navy crew for the DSARC III demonstration, and
then will eventually be assigned to the lead and follow ships. In parallel,
additional people will cycle through the LBTS for training.
About six to twelve sailors will be permanent residents of
the LBTS under one officer in the grade of LCDR/CDR. They will
operate and maintain the site and cycle through changes etc. as
required.
It is planned to instruct civilian workers from the three
builders who win the PF procurement contract in all aspects of the
installation and tests required by the PFCS. These individuals in
turn will supervise installation and test of the PFCS at their respective
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building sites and instruct Navy precommissioning crews. These
crews in turn will form the nucleus of the crew that takes the ship
through trials and eventually to the fleet.
6. What impact would stretching out of the production decision
at DSARC III have on operation of the LBTS?
The LBTS was primarily built as a vehicle to demonstrate
the PFCS at DSARC III, and in the long term, to support the life
cycle of the ship. In this regard, at least in the short run, activity
at the LBTS is directed toward the DSARC III presentation. These
activities of themselves should be the cause for any delay of the produc-
tion decision at DSARC III, rather than DSARC III causing the stretch-
ing out. Other than a complete cancellation of the PF program then,
the LBTS is here to stay.
7. What is considered to be the "salvage value" of the test site?
,
Assuming that the program receives a green light at the pro-
duction decision, a realistic salvage value cannot be assigned to the
site at this time. That can only be really determined when the site
is closed down.
The major purpose of the LBTS is to determine if it is feasible
to do what you want to do. In effect money is being spent now so that
fifty times as much isn't required in the future to obtain the same
results, whether good or bad. The $12 million or so invested in the
LBTS is certainly a small cost in comparison with a projected cost
of over $3 billion for the fifty ship buy.
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8. How closely does the LBTS duplicate both human and machine
operations of the combat system aboard ship?
It is the intent to duplicate as closely as possible shipboard
conditions. Equipment limitations and the use of simulation was
addressed in Chapter 5. From the human aspect, the LBTS is almost
identical to a shipboard installation down to fire extinguishers on the
bulkheads and Playmates posted in switchboard doors.
Environmental factors preclude bringing jet aircraft against the
site at high speeds and low altitudes, and simulators will have to be
relied upon heavily for such tests. However, real life tends to be not
as confusing, mixed up, nor saturated as the situations presented via
simulations. In simulations, the kitchen sink can be thrown in but
realistically, there are only so many aircraft that can come at you,
and they are as confused as you are as to what the situation is.
9. What will be the training status of the crew used for the
DSARC III demonstration?
For the PFCS, this question lends itself naturally to another
one. How can a combat system be tested under ideal conditions when
the training period leading up to the test period is minimal? Are you
testing the combat system or are you testing the training of the demon-
stration crew?
At the LBTS, the Navy crew will have approximately one month
"hands on" training prior to the start of IOT&E. In this short time
frame, they will be required to reach a level of competency often not
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reached by fleet units during a six month buildup and several weeks of
refresher training.
Additionally, there exists an educational/technical gap between
Navy and contractor T&E personnel. The contractor is represented by
well-paid, highly experienced, and technically competent engineers and
technical support personnel, which gives him the edge in structuring
the T&E effort to his contractual advantage.
10. How is approval for service use as a result of DSARC III, and
the Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS) acceptance for service use
from acceptance trials viewed by LBTS personnel?
Sperry and LBTS Navy personnel understand that they are
assembling a combat system to accomplish the mission required. Their
effort is directed toward making the beast work. The BIS in its accept-
ance trials tests not only how well the combat system performs its
assigned tasks, but brings in points of contention such as whether a
certain light should be red or amber, are phone jacks located in acces-
sible places (even though they may have been located in accordance with
MILSPECS)
f
and other such considerations.
Admiral Zumwalt, testifying before a hearing on Cost Escala-
tion in Defense Procurement Contracts in 1973, stated that he had
command of a destroyer in 1957 which was one of 100 consecutive
destroyers found to be unsatisfactory by the BIS. "Yet my ship won




-efficiency pennant and yet if you read the INSURV report, we couldn't
go to war. "
The best way to handle deficiencies is to make sure they never
arise in the first place because of design or fabrication shortfalls. Thus
it appears that there should be a closer relationship between BIS per-
sonnel charged with acceptance of systems and personnel involved in
presenting a system to the DSARC for service approval.
11. How flexible is the site for expansion of PF projects?. For
alteration to similar ship systems?
The PMU is a physical model of the actual PF shipboard
spaces. As such it is a very useful tool to aid in determining the space
allocation requirements for growth items. The LBTS itself is space
limited to a certain degree within the existing building if it is desired
to build PMU's of other classes of ships. However space does exist,,
whereby equipment could be placed on pallets and connected to the
PCA to conduct various equipment /computer interface tests. Real
estate wise, grounds exist to extend the existing building by a con-
siderable amount.
12. What systems will be taken from the LBTS to Bath for instal-
lation aboard the lead ship? Will specific subsystems be tested/
integrated at the LBTS prior to being sent to the shipbuilders?
There is a possibility that all the equipment comprising the
PMU installation will be sent to Bath for installation aboard the lead
L ±%J V\ *_ v
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ship. In this manner, shipboard installation and check out would have
as its basis a completely checked out combat system. Presently under
consideration is what specific subsystems, if any, should be cycled
through the LBTS prior to shipboard installation. Even a partial
cycling of critical units through the LBTS would improve configuration
control, enhance check-out of the equipment, and provide an opportunity
for LBTS personnel to bring equipment up to the latest change status
and conduct system level tests on the equipment integrated into the
system. •
Contractors and shipbuilders are instructed to install GFE in
ships. Often the equipment to be installed has not been adequately
modified to reflect the latest change status, or parts are missing.
The LBTS has not escaped this either. For instance, the CWI units
for the Mk 92 FCS were received without several cards and/or drawer
.
components. Often such equipment is installed and equipment /sub-
system level tests are in progress before it is discovered that a crystal
buried in the back of a chassis is missing. Cycling high risk items
through the LBTS would help to alleviate this problem.
Another concept that merits consideration encompasses the
cycling of equipment through the LBTS where it could be checked out
by a verification and test team. This same team could follow the sys-
tem on board ship where they would be responsible for integration




the follow ships are scheduled to go down the ways at the rate of one
per month, it is feasible from a manning standpoint.
13. How were the following site selection criteria decided?
-Cost effectiveness (stressing maximum utilization of existing
assets consistent with the mission of the facility employed)?
Once Sperry received the contract to design, build and operate
the PFCSLBTS, the decision as to where the test site should be located
was Sperry's. Thus cost effectiveness has to be viewed from Sperry's
viewpoint and this information is not available.
-Minimum MILCON requirement.
It is understood that one of the factors leading to the decision
to place Sperry under contractual obligation to build the test site with
R&D funds was the long lead time required to obtain funding via MIL-
CON channels. MILCON funding requirements were thus minimized
(zero), but whether or not a greater amount of R&D funds were required
to erect the LBTS is unknown.
-Adequate source of professional talent and skilled labor, good
housing, and community services.
Once again such considerations were made by Sperry. It is
understood that considerations such as those listed above came to bear
in Sperry's decision, but again, this information is not available.
-Availability of fleet computer programming groups.
It does not appear that this was a consideration. UNIVAC is
tasked with the development of programs, and Sperry with the running
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and check out of these programs. While Navy fleet computer groups
are monitoring the progress and will become actively involved in the
certification of the PFCS, it does not appear that their availability was
a factor in site selection.
-Availability of fleet units in the area.
This was not a consideration as can best be determined.
-Availability of controlled Navy aircraft services with minimum
airspace restriction.
Sperry has previously used the area in which the PFCSLBTS is
located to conduct tests on the AN/SPG-55B Terrier FCS. Basedon -
this experience it was postulated that adequate aircraft services could
be obtained to support PFCS tests. It is obvious that more realistic
flight paths could be programmed if the LBTS were remotely located,
and this is another tradeoff that was made in site selection.
-Easy accessibility coupled with good security.
Again this was a Sperry decision. Under the terms of their
contract Sperry is responsible for providing security at the LBTS.
No fault can be found with their system which consists of a badge and
sign in/out log. Visitors must be signed in by site personnel and
escorted. The site itself is easy to reach and more than adequate
parking is provided.
-Near large body of water (for electromagnetic propagation
considerations).
There is no problem in this area on Long Island.
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-Controlled electromagnetic environment.
Sperry conducted many ECM/ECCM checks on the AN/SPG-
55B FCS. While the environment around the LBTS can be controlled
only to a limited extent, it must be remembered that the radars asso-
ciated with fire control systems operate in a frequency range not
normally employed by civilian activities. As such then, little inter-
ference with FCS ECM/ECCM testing is anticipated.
-Accessibility to collocated NAVSEC engineering groups and
SHAPM.
Unless the LBTS was located in Washington, the present
location is as good as might be expected. It is located a stone's throw
from MacArthur Airport and airline schedules to and from Washington
are such that people coming to the LBTS from Washington can arrive
in "the morning and depart in the afternoon with a minimum of delay.
14. How will the test site be certified? What does certification
of the test site mean? Are the simulations being used certified?
The LBTS will be certified by a certification activity desig-
nated by PMS-399. At the present time (March 1974) it looks like this
activity will be the eastern detachment of the Naval Ships Missile
System Engineering Station.
Certification, as defined within PF Programs, is the process
of conducting a test procedure at the PFCSLBTS (or other facility) in
order to ensure that it is correct, accurate and complete with respect
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to the equipment being tested. A test procedure will be certified
as being correct on satisfactory completion of certification. Certifica-
tion of the PFCSLBTS in essence means that the site has been tested
as a combat system and the results of these tests show that the site
does indeed operate as the combat system designed.
Simulations being used at the LBTS at the present time do not
have a certification in the sense of acceptance via testing in accordance
with an approved test plan. Sperry is developing a plan to demonstrate
that in fact the simulations represent actual equipment. In the sense
that individual simulations support the overall conduction of certifica-
tion tests, the simulators will be certified at the time the PFCSLBTS
is certified.
15. What factors will be introduced during testing to simulate
power fluctuations, power failures, heat and cold, air conditioning
failures, chill water that isn't chilled, etc. ?
None. Environmental testing to required specifications is to
have been completed during equipment manufacture and test. Deliberate
failures are not planned to be introduced during the course of testing at
the LBTS. The site is powered from the Long Island Power Company,
and this power is thought to be less regulated and more apt to drop
than shipboard power. There will probably be a sizeable number of
other type failures encountered in the normal course of events.
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In summary, this section attempts to pose some pointed questions
concerning the PFCSLBTS, and to provide some answers. Life being
what it is, there always appears to be more questions than answers.
Much was left unquestioned and unanswered such as: "What is the
value and what has been said and done about the necessity of developing
and retaining, permanently, within the Navy, the expertise required to
integrate a combat system? "; "How will the LBTS be integrated with
BIS and OPTEVFOR for lead and follow ship testing? " and "What are
the real cost/effectiveness considerations for the LBTS? "
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
A. GENERAL
This thesis should be considered neither a compendium of combat
system test and evaluation nor a handbook of solutions based on the
approach of the Patrol Frigate program via a land-based test site.
It does trace emerging doctrines encompassing ship acquisition T&cE
and investigates the PFLBTS as an innovative approach to a practical
solution. The complexities of modern shipboard combat systems have
been discussed as has efforts to formalize the test and evaluation
requirements for these systems. To date however, the strides that
have been made in T&E are due largely to the confiction of the managers
involved. The use of land-based sites in T&E investigated in this thesis
has been developed from an empirical rather than a theoretical analysis.
Successful implementation of T&E policy must be based primarily on
past experience, and personnel involved with ship T&E policy should
have some background in ship acquisition programs both from a the-
oretical and a "hands on" base. This will allow thorough attention to
proposals for future improvements that will continually be present in
this emergent field.
B. SIMULATION AT THE PFLBTS
In recognition of the cost to procure, install, operate, and main-
tain a total ship combat system, including all its sensor and weapons
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subsystems, the PFLBTS relies on simulation for interface testing of
certain hardware and software items. This imposes limitations on the
facility; these limitations appear acceptable in that the PFLBTS has
consistently retained the option, within funding constraints, for instal-
lation of further equipment and subsystems should experience prove it
to be vital to the T&E program.
Simulations provide T&E personnel the opportunity to subject men
and machines to a much wider variety of test situations than one could
normally expect when working with complete systems.
C. LBTS COST/EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS
When considering the expenditure of funds required for the estab-
lishment and operation of a LBTS, it should be remembered that, with
few exceptions, these costs will be incurred anyway, i. e. , if not at the
LBTS, then somewhere else. The task of proving the integration of the
total ship combat system must necessarily be accomplished.
Although the "effectiveness" of a test facility is not amenable to
precise definition or measurement, its cost can be defined and es-
timated with some certainty. If alternatives in execution of a TSTP
are limited to T&E at a LBTS or T&E aboard ship, then both alter-
natives could by definition be "effective" and thus have a constant




As previously stated, the costs of the LBTS itself can be deter-
mined with some degree of precision. The cost of obtaining a success-
ful T&E via fragmented testing at a diversity of test sites under
different managers may only be conjured up. Based on the experiences
of past T&E programs such as the DLGN-36, it is postulated that ship-
board testing, having as its basis adequate LBTS support, is much less
costly. The answer is locked in the future.
D. ADVANTAGES OF LAND-BASED TESTING
Some advantages of utilization of a dedicated LBTS such as that
being employed in the PF Program include:
1. Software debug and testing can be accomplished in a controlled
hardware environment.
2. System integration debugging can be started earlier since it
is not tied to the ship construction schedule and, parenthetically, con-
struction delays.
3. Software debugging can be accomplished in an environment
free of industrial work.
4. Use of simulation and simulators can be optimized both on a
single project and multi-project levels. One simulator can support
more than one system integration effort as can hardware.




6. From the "people" perspective it concentrates your best
people at one site. These are the same people that follow the system
integration effort through to final ship acceptance.
7. Support software, debug aids, data extraction and reduction
and analytical tools can be provided on-site and shared by more than
one project.
8. Test site provides earlier "hands on" experience for the
nucleus crew and key personnel.
9. GFE software can be "certified" prior to delivery to the
contractor shipbuilder.
10. The test site is a step toward satisfying the necessity to
develop and retain, permanently, within the Navy, the expertise
required to test, evaluate, and integrate a ship combat system.
11. It meets DOD requirements to "fly-before-buy. "
E. T&E AND THE PATROL FRIGATE
Admiral Woodfin and others have cited several reasons why the
PFCS integration should not proceed down the "primrose path" taken
by previous ship acquisitions. The PF Program has integrated total
ship testing into the design from the outset. This includes HME,
combat system, and mobility. The integrated test program includes:
receipt inspection, installation and check out of equipment, equipment
testing, intra system tests, inter system tests, builder trials, and
acceptance trials. Integration includes utilization of a dedicated
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CSLBTS that is a faithful reproduction of the ship. The computer soft-
ware, combat system integration, and test site development is being
performed by one contractor. The tests performed at the test site
will be directly transferable to the ship and test site personnel will be
involved in the shipboard testing. The PF Program has a combat sys-
tems integration manager, responsible for the total system. Finally,
the lead ship is being acquired on a cost type contract basis, which
will facilitate dealing with integration problems as they occur.
In conclusion, although there is little in major weapon system
acquisition that can be predicted with absolute certainty, upon careful
consideration, few can deny the legitimacy and fertility of the utiliza-
tion of a LBTS to reduce uncertainty in ship acquisition testing. "By
your test results, ye shall be known", could well serve as a motto for
the PFCSLBTS.
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
1. During the time frame that this thesis was being researched
and written, the PFCSLBTS was in the process of being built. All of
the equipment was not scheduled to have arrived, and the bulk of the
equipment at the site was in the process of being powered. Subsystem
and system testing obviously had not started. It would be of interest
to continue to follow the evolution of the PFCSLBTS through to its
final wake, be it at the end of DSARC III, or when the last PF is
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decommissioned some thirty years or so hence. Main points for
consideration include:
-Did the PFCSLBTS fill its mission to provide the facilities and
personnel to test integrated ship combat systems.
-How effective was the LBTS in discovering and correcting (or
causing correction), subsystem, interface and computer program
problems.
-What was the post audit cost of the test site and did indeed a
constant effectiveness situation exist between the LBTS and other
viable alternatives.
2. The use of a LBTS and of prototyping has been proposed as an
alternative conducive to reducing uncertainty in an acquisition program.
A subjective analysis of available alternatives leads one to the con-
clusion that a LBTS is a viable approach. Would the same results
be obtained from a quantitative analysis?
3. Gordon W. Rule in a recent newspaper article, advocated
slowing the production schedule of the PF to gain additional time for
testing of the Mk 92 FCS, a Dutch designed system, and the Mk 75 gun,
an Italian design. Another article reported that the cost of the PF is
now about $70 million each, compared with $45 million in 1971. It
would be of interest to analyze actual costs with budgeted costs of the
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